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In the Wake of the Storm: Environment, Disaster, 
and Race After Katrina
Executive Summary
HURRICANE KATRINA opened a window on a world
of hurt often ignored by media, policymakers, and
the public. Facing enhanced environmental vul-
nerability and stranded by a lack of public transit,
residents of the poorest and blackest neighbor-
hoods of New Orleans quickly educated America
that disasters and rescues are not equal opportunity
affairs.
Among the few not shocked by the stark images
splashing across television screens were scholars
and activists in the field of environmental justice
(EJ). These researchers study chronic risk, gener-
ally finding that lower-income minority commu-
nities, like those of New Orleans’ Lower Ninth
Ward, are disproportionately exposed to hazards
and other disamenities. Katrina, it seemed, simply
reflected environmental injustice in an accelerated
and accentuated mode.
Does environmental disparities by race and class
really exist? Researchers have gone back and forth,
with early studies supplanted by newer studies
supplanted by still newer studies. Although the
evidence is still emerging, the best assessment is
that disparities are common, and researchers in-
creasingly suspect that some observed differences
in health outcomes are attributable to environ-
mental factors, particularly in combination with
social stressors related to poverty and lesser access
to health care. And it is not just income: race
seems to be a more significant predictor in many
studies, suggesting the importance of deeply
rooted systems of privilege and discrimination.
Minority and low-income Americans are also
more likely to be underserved by government and
private relief agencies before, during, and after en-
vironmental calamities such as Katrina. Before a
disaster, minorities are more likely to be underpre-
pared and underinsured, and to be living in unsafe,
substandard housing. During a disaster, minorities
and the poor are often—due to economic and
language barriers—less exposed to disaster warn-
ings, and more likely to encounter ethnic insensi-
tivity from relief workers and government officials.
After a disaster, minorities and low-income individ-
uals suffer slow recoveries not only because they
have less insurance and lower incomes, but also be-
cause they receive less information, fewer loans, and
less government relief, and encounter bias in the
search for long-term housing.
This sort of “second disaster” for those with
scantier economic and political resources seems
to be playing out in the aftermath of Katrina.
Many in the low-income neighborhoods ravaged
by the hurricane are concerned that federal, state,
and local officials will not prioritize their commu-
nities for cleanup and reconstruction, and worry
that New Orleans will become little more than a
theme park for tourists. Responding proactively
to the impacts of Hurricane Katrina requires an
eco-social approach—one that makes explicit the
connections between public health, the environ-
ment, and social inequality.
Beyond Katrina, we need to revamp both disas-
ter preparedness and environmental policy. There
has been some progress; public and private agen-
cies have disseminated information in more lan-
guages, hired diversity experts to educate their
officials and staff, and provided increased support
for disaster research. But little of that seems to
have rubbed off on Federal Emergency Manage-
ment Agency (FEMA) in its response to Katrina,
and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development has not stepped up to offer the
housing vouchers for poor victims that were so 
effective in the wake of the 1994 Northridge
California quake.
Likewise, progress on a more inclusive environ-
mental policy has been made at the state level but
seems to be stalling at the national level. The U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has re-
versed course from the two previous administra-
tions and sought to both take the focus off race in
regulatory enforcement activities and diminish the
annual collection of pollution emission data that
researchers, communities, and industries use to
monitor firm-level environmental performance.
If there is a will to do better, there are ways.
Seizing the opportunity opened by Katrina is pos-
sible. The differential effects of this disaster were
neither natural nor an accident. They were consis-
tent with a pervasive continuum in which low-
income and minority communities suffer from
both higher socioeconomic stress and greater en-
vironmental exposures to air toxins, hazardous
wastes, and other environmental disamenities.
Furthermore, it is not just poor and minority
communities that are at risk. A hazardous facility
can be sited in someone else’s backyard, but re-
search shows that the effects soon spill over into
other neighborhoods. Establishing fairness as a
guidepost for disaster and environmental plan-
ning is not just the right thing to do—it may be
the best thing for protecting the well-being of all
Americans.
Katrina did open a window on a dark side of
America—the economic and environmental vul-
nerability of low-income people and minority
communities. We can close that window, or we
can use the new view to chart a better, healthier,
and more equitable future for us all.
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INTRODUCTION: LIFTING THE VEIL
ON MONDAY, August 29, 2005, the gale force winds
of Hurricane Katrina swept across the Gulf Coast.
Although the hurricane’s wind and water pummeled
many parts of Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama,
the eyes of the nation were focused on New Orleans,
a city where a complicated system of levees and canals
had been designed to prevent any storm from flood-
ing neighborhoods and districts. Unfortunately, as
some analysts had warned, the levees were not up
to the challenge of Katrina, and breaks quickly ap-
peared, flooding the city, and creating a humanitar-
ian crisis of extraordinary proportions.
Even as Katrina was sweeping away businesses,
homes, and lives, a stark set of images of desperate and
seemingly abandoned residents began to shatter many
of the illusions Americans usually associate with disas-
ters. The first of these was that the government would
always be there as an effective safety net. Amidst the
confusion of coordinating various governmental agen-
cies and a slow and now much criticized federal re-
sponse, stranded individuals and families were often
left to fend—or not fend—for themselves. The in-
adequacy of federal, state, and local efforts led to a
growing wave of criticism and cynicism about govern-
ment capacity. Partly as a result, the director of the
Federal Emergency Management Agency first stepped
down from heading the Katrina relief effort and then
resigned from the agency.
The second illusion that Katrina swept away was
the traditional belief that natural disasters are a sort
of equal opportunity affair—acts of God that affect
us all. But as the government’s emergency rescue
and recovery efforts floundered, particularly in be-
leaguered New Orleans, the country began to real-
ize that this was not the case. It was a largely African
American and often poor populace that had lived in
the areas most vulnerable to the collapse of the lev-
ees, that proved unable to secure transportation to
evacuate the city, and that was now scrambling in
frightening conditions to secure scarce aid for their
families, their friends, and themselves. Both the im-
pacts of and response to disaster, it seemed, were
heavily affected by income and race.
Although this seemed a revelation to many re-
porters and politicians, one group of researchers and
activists were far less surprised: those who had been
laboring in the field of what is called environmental
justice (EJ). Born of an intersection of emerging so-
cial movements, technological advances in geo-
graphic information systems and spatial statistics, and
a growing policymaker interest in disproportionately
affected communities, the environmental justice field
has generally focused on the distribution of environ-
mental costs and benefits. Although data issues and
methodological disputes remain, an array of case
studies and large-scale statistical analyses had long
been suggesting that disparities in environmental
conditions were a worrisome norm in many parts
of the United States—including Louisiana, a place
where a disproportionate share of African Americans
were already living in a petrochemical corridor best
known by a frightening nickname, “Cancer Alley.”
What is environmental justice and how does it offer
a prism for thinking about disaster vulnerability? How
solid is the evidence of environmental disparity—and
is the seeming inequity in exposure and effects from
Katrina consistent with evidence from other disaster
experiences? And, given these patterns, what are the
policy implications for environmental regulation,
emergency preparedness, and disaster recovery?
In this report, we offer a review of the existing lit-
erature and research on the relationship between race,
the environment, and large-scale disasters. Our cen-
tral points are simple. First, environmental inequities
by race and often by income seem to be an established
part of the American urban landscape—Katrina
simply tore back the cover on this unfortunate fact.
Second, disasters reflect what might be termed acute
risks that, like the chronic risks targeted by environ-
mental justice analysis, are often distributed in a way
that reflects established chasms of power. Third, this
uneven distribution of risk may impose heavy and un-
fair costs on certain populations and seems as well to
lead to an overall underinvestment in prevention and
preparedness, thus increasing burdens for the society
as a whole. Making environmental justice principles
part of preparedness and environmental policy, in
short, is not simply the right thing to do—it is the
prudent thing to do.
We begin our analysis by briefly reviewing the
Katrina emergency using it as a platform for under-
standing the conceptual frameworks used in envi-
ronmental justice research and the field of disaster
studies. We suggest that disaster prevention is a clas-
sic “public good” with all the attendant issues: free
riders who enjoy benefits but pay few costs, the con-
sequent privatization of benefits and costs, and the
skewed distribution of risk that results. The disaster
studies field has long stressed the importance of
socioeconomic factors in such skewed distributions,
but the environmental justice framework offers new
insights into the roles of race and power as well as of
the market. Moreover, the broad view of the environ-
ment associated with the environmental justice para-
digm—which includes not only exposure to lower air
quality and proximity to hazards but also the distrib-
ution of transportation access and housing—makes
the framework a good fit for understanding the im-
pacts of disasters and their aftermath, including poli-
cies for preparedness, relief, and reconstruction.
We then look at the debate over the patterns of
environmental disparities by race, class, and other
factors. We note that proponents offer three main
explanations for any disparities, with one explana-
tion rooted in rational land use (and its unintended
consequences), another rooted in market or income
dynamics, and a third focused on the impact of dif-
ferential political power. Of course, whether any of
these theories account for patterns of difference de-
pends on whether such patterns indeed exist. We
therefore provide a review of the available studies,
pointing to the evolution of research and conclud-
ing that the evidence is generally supportive of the
hypothesis of disparity. Moreover, each of the mar-
ket, power, and land use explanations finds some
support in both the statistics and experience.
This essentially establishes that there is a problem.
How that problem plays out in the context of disas-
ters is seen as we review the intersection of disaster
vulnerability with race and other socioeconomic
variables. This evidentiary review relies more on 
case studies than on the large sample statistical tests
used in environmental disparity research, in part be-
cause disasters are (fortunately) few and environ-
mental degradation is (unfortunately) widespread.
We break the analysis into considerations before,
during, and after disasters, and find parallels with the
findings of disparity that emerge from the environ-
mental justice research. We close this section by ex-
ploring the implications of these disparities for risk
reduction, particularly with regard to homeland se-
curity, a growing area of concern in light of the ter-
rorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
We then present what we term the second
disaster—the problems that often arise in rebuilding
and recovery—and stress how the environmental
justice lens can lead to an approach that helps ensure
that disaster recovery and reconstruction will not
contribute to further inequalities. We emphasize
two concepts driving the edge of research and pol-
icy in the field of environmental equity: cumulative
exposure and social vulnerability. Cumulative expo-
sure refers to the agglomeration of environmental
disamenities in certain communities, a problem that
is often bypassed by pollution strategies based on
facility-by-facility regulation, whereas social vulner-
ability refers to the capability of communities to
weather the health and other risks of environmental
disamenities or disasters, particularly with regard to
their command over economic and other resources.
We conclude by stressing that the focus of environ-
mental justice on disparities in hazards and disameni-
ties is but a starting point in the work. Environmental
justice activists and researchers have also offered a
forward-looking view that both questions the nature
of America’s metropolitan landscapes and calls for a
profound democratization in decision making. This
emphasis on urban form and local voice can offer
guidance to the rebuilding of New Orleans and the
rest of the Gulf Coast. Moreover, an intriguing set
of new studies suggests that environmental justice
could actually be good for everyone: when the dis-
parities between groups are lower, so is overall envi-
ronmental risk. By contrast, being able to put hazards
in “someone else’s backyard” ends up creating more
hazards for the society as a whole.
It is a lesson that should be familiar—the civil
rights movement, after all, initially focused on ad-
dressing disparities faced by African Americans in hir-
ing, housing, and voting. The resulting sea change in
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political opinion and the attendant changes in gov-
ernmental policy led to changes that, though still
short of what many wished, helped to make America
a better and more productive nation. Taking the is-
sues of environmental inequity seriously can likewise
improve both environmental quality and disaster pre-
paredness for all Americans.
DISASTERS, RISK, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
Hurricane Katrina occurred in the southern United
States—a region with a long history of coping with
weather-related disasters that include droughts, floods,
tornados, and hurricanes. Each year, communities
along the Atlantic and Gulf Coast states are hit with
tropical storms and hurricanes forcing millions to
flee to higher ground. Historically, the Atlantic hur-
ricane season produces ten storms, of which about
six become hurricanes and two to three become
major hurricanes. The 2005 hurricane season, how-
ever, produced a record twenty-seven named storms,
topping the previous record of twenty-one set in
1933, and thirteen hurricanes, besting the old record
of twelve set in 1969 (Tanneeru 2005).
The South is also host to the majority of the na-
tion’s African American population. Today, over
54 percent of the nation’s blacks live in the South
(McKinnon 2001). In the fifteen southern states,
excluding Texas and Florida, blacks make up 23 per-
cent of the population, versus about 12 percent for
the nation as a whole. African Americans make up an
even larger share of the three Gulf Coast states 
hardest hit by Katrina—Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Alabama. They comprise 32 percent of the popu-
lation in Louisiana, 36 percent in Mississippi, and
26 percent in Alabama.
The areas most affected by Katrina were even
blacker and poorer. New Orleans was more than
67 percent black before Katrina (U.S. Bureau of Cen-
sus 2000). The coastal Mississippi counties where
Katrina struck ranged from 25 percent to 87 percent
black. Poverty was also a common characteristic.
Some 28 percent of New Orleans residents lived below
the poverty level and more than 80 percent of those
were black. The poverty rate was 17.7 percent in
Gulfport, Mississippi, and 21.2 percent in Mobile,
Alabama, in 2000, versus 11.3 percent in the nation
as a whole (U.S. Census Bureau 2001).
Of course, those most likely to be left behind as
the flood waters rose in New Orleans were from
neighborhoods that were even poorer and more
African American. Such increased vulnerability is
typical of the South, a place where the history of
slavery, Jim Crow, and white resistance has affected
both race relations and the region’s ecology. The
plantation system exploited not only humans but also
the land, and the South has often been thought of
as a sacrifice zone, a sort of dump for the rest of the
nation’s toxic waste (Bullard 1990a, 1990b, 2000).
This has been helped along by local governments
and businesses that take economic and environmen-
tal advantage of those who are politically and socially
powerless (Schueler 1992).
It should thus be no surprise that the environmen-
tal quality that Southerners experience is markedly dif-
ferent from that of other regions of the country. Lax
enforcement of environmental regulations has left the
region’s air,water, and land themost industry-befouled
in the United States. Louisiana typifies this pattern.
Nearly three-fourths of Louisiana’s population—more
than 3 million people—get their drinking water from
underground aquifers. Dozens of the aquifers are
threatened by contamination from polluting indus-
tries (O’Byrne and Schleifstein 1991, A5).
New Orleans is also prototypical of environmental
justice issues in the Gulf Coast region. The city’s loca-
tion along the Mississippi River Chemical Corridor,
a place hosting more than 125 companies that manu-
facture a range of products including fertilizers, gaso-
line, paints, and plastics, increased its vulnerability to
environmental threats (Roberts and Toffolon-Weiss
2001). New Orleans also had a highly significant child-
hood environmental lead poisoning problem. There
were ongoing air quality impacts and the resulting
high asthma and respiratory disease rates led to fre-
quent visits to emergency rooms for treatment by
both children and adults (Wright 2005).
In short, environmental health problems and issues
related to environmental exposure were hot-button
issues in New Orleans long before Katrina’s flood-
waters emptied the city. When the hurricane hit, the
existing inequalities and the history of discrimination
in the American South played out in tragic yet pre-
dictable ways. Evacuation strategies, for example, left
the most vulnerable populations—the poor, minori-
ties, the elderly—inadequately protected. A Times-
Picayune reporter, Bruce Nolan, summed up the
emergency transportation plan eloquently: “City,
state and federal emergency officials are preparing to
give the poorest of New Orleans’ poor a historically
blunt message: In the event of a major hurricane,
you’re on your own” (2005).
In the Wake of the Storm 3
Local, state, and federal emergency planners had
known for years the risks facing New Orleans’ transit-
dependent residents, particularly after the experience
with Hurricane Georges in 1998 and Hurricane Ivan
in 2004 (State of Louisiana 2000; Fischetti 2001;
Bourne 2004; City of New Orleans 2005). Whereas
92 percent of American households own at least one
motor vehicle, two in ten households (20 percent)
in the Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama disaster
area had none (Associated Press 2005a). More than
30 percent of African Americans in New Orleans
do not own a car. Before Katrina, nearly 25 percent
of New Orleans residents relied on public trans-
portation (Katz, Fellowes, and Holmes 2005). The
city already knew that at least “100,000 New
Orleans citizens do not have means of personal
transportation” to evacuate in case of a major storm
(City of New Orleans 2005).
The city’s emergency plan thus called for thou-
sands of the city’s most vulnerable population to be
left behind in their homes, shelters, and hospitals
(Schleifstein 2005). ‘It also included the use of pub-
lic buses to evacuate those without transportation:
sixty-four buses and ten lift vans. The plan proved
woefully inadequate, especially after nearly two hun-
dred New Orleans Rapid Transit Authority (RTA)
vehicles were lost to flooding (Eggler 2005, B1).
Let Them Eat Risk? Wealth, Rights, 
and Vulnerability
Why were so many left at risk? Many have pointed
to the incompetence of various agencies, especially
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Storm Costs and Insurance
• Katrina is likely the most destructive hurricane in
U.S. history, costing more than $70 billion in in-
sured damage. The total economic losses from the
storm are expected to exceed $125 billion (Chu
2005, A2). It was also one of the deadliest storms
in decades, with a death toll of 1,325, and still
counting.
• FEMA estimates that 12.7 percent of the households
in Alabama, 15 percent in Mississippi, and 46 per-
cent in Louisiana have flood insurance. Only 8 per-
cent of the businesses in hurricane-affected counties
in Alabama, 15 percent in Mississippi, and 30 percent
in Louisiana have flood coverage (Chu 2005, A1).
Job Loss
• More than a million Louisiana residents fled
Hurricane Katrina, of which an estimated 100,000
to 300,000 could end up permanently displaced. The
powerful storm ravaged an eight-parish labor market
that supported 617,300 jobs (Randolph 2005, 1A).
• In October 2005, a total of 281,745 Louisiana resi-
dents filed for unemployment benefits, citing Katrina
as the cause for joblessness. This figure equated to
14 percent of the workers in the state or 47 percent
of all the workers in the seven-parish New Orleans
region (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2005). The
unemployment rate for white Katrina evacuees was
24 percent, versus just under 50 percent for blacks
and 42 percent for Hispanics (Economic Policy
Institute 2005).
Katrina Toxic Contamination and Health Threats
• Katrina caused six major oil spills releasing 7.4 million
gallons of oil, about 60 percent of that leaked in the
Exxon Valdez incident in 1989 (Cone and Powers
2005).
• The storm hit sixty underground storage tanks, five
Superfund sites, 466 industrial facilities that stored
highly dangerous chemicals before the storm, and
disabled more than 1,000 drinking-water systems,
creating a toxic soup with E. coli in the floodwaters
far exceeding EPA’s safe levels (Cone 2005, A18).
Flooded Homes
• An estimated 140,000 to 160,000 homes in Loui-
siana may need to be demolished and disposed.
• More than 110,000 of New Orleans’ 180,000
houses were flooded, and 90,000 sat for days or
weeks in more than six feet of water. As many as
30,000 to 50,000 homes citywide may have to be
demolished, and extensive repairs.
Flooded Schools
• Katrina displaced just under 350,000 school chil-
dren in the Gulf Coast. An estimated 187,000
school children have been displaced in Louisiana,
160,000 in Mississippi, and 3,118 in Alabama
(Hunter 2005).
• The powerful storm closed the entire New Orleans
school system—116 schools and about 60,000
students—and left a trail of toxic muck in class-
rooms and playgrounds (Ritea 2006).
Katrina Hits—and Hits Hard
FEMA. We think, however, that the answers lie in 
a deeper analysis of the way in which our society allo-
cates risk and protection. This is not to excuse 
government failures—we join the chorus of condem-
nation in that regard—but rather to offer a framework
that explains the continuum from the acute circum-
stances of disasters to the chronic risks imposed by en-
vironmental degradation. Equally important, we need
to understand why it is that certain populations seem
to suffer differential exposures to both crises such as
Katrina and the slow-motion disasters that often
plague communities suffering from high levels of air
pollution, lead poisoning, or nearby toxic wastes.
Vulnerability to natural disasters such as Katrina and
to man-made environmental hazards such as refiner-
ies is, to a large extent, a public bad: disasters and
hazards typically hit communities, not isolated indi-
viduals. By the same token, measures to reduce vul-
nerability and hazards are public goods. That is, they
cannot be purchased or otherwise secured by indi-
viduals acting alone: their provision requires proactive
public policies.
Yet disaster-vulnerability reduction and environ-
mental protection are seldom “pure” public goods. A
pure public good is something that when provided to
one is provided to all (a characteristic known as non-
excludability), and whose consumption by one does
not diminish its availability to others (nonrivalness).
In the twentieth century, the textbook case of a pure
public good was national defense; in the twenty-first
century, it may become policies to combat global
warming.
Many risk-reduction measures are “impure” public
goods: when provided to one, they are provided to
others, but not equally to all. For example, flood-
control projects provide location-specific benefits,
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Source: © Michael Ainsworth, Dallas Morning News, Corbis.
Note: Louis Jones, eighty-one, right, and Catherine McZeal, sixty-two, left, help each other walk down flooded
Poydras Street as they went to the Superdome on Thursday, September 1, 2005, days after Hurricane Katrina
flooded New Orleans. The couple got together to help each other through their crisis. “They wouldn’t let our
children help us,” Mrs. McZeal said, referring to the fact that people were not allowed to drive into the area to
get relatives.
restricted to those people who live or own assets in the
protected area. By virtue of where they live, work,
or own property, some members of society reap the
benefits of such collective investments, and others
do not.
This means that, in addition to the public policy
question of how much risk-reduction to provide,
policymakers and the public must grapple with the
question of who should receive it. We face not only
the classic economic problem of the allocation of
scarce resources among competing ends, but also
the classic political-economy problem of the allocation
of scarce resources among competing individuals,
groups, and classes.
This allocation question itself has two dimensions.
One is normative, or prescriptive: to whom should
resources for such risk reduction be allocated in
principle? How, for example, should government
resources be spent to prevent disasters, mitigate their
effects, and compensate their victims? The other
dimension is positive, or descriptive: to whom are
risk-related resources allocated in practice? Who, in
fact, receives a higher level of protection or recovery
assistance, and what drives the pattern? And although
these questions and their answers are most dramatic in
the case of a crisis like Katrina, the issue of allocating
risk permeates environmental practice and policy on
an everyday basis.
There are two fundamentally different approaches
to addressing risk distribution: the wealth- or market-
based approach and the rights-based approach. The
wealth-based approach—which is standard practice
in most of the cost-benefit analyses that government
agencies undertake—is founded on the idea that will-
ingness of individuals to pay, to safeguard the envi-
ronment or to protect themselves from hazards
suggests the value of such protection. The wealth-
based approach implies that the allocation of disas-
ter-vulnerability reduction, like the allocation of
goods and services in the marketplace, ought to be
guided by explicit and implicit market signals: those
who pay more deserve to get more.
If all individuals had roughly similar wealth and
purchasing power, this approach to decision making
would not translate into systematic disparities in dis-
aster vulnerability. That is, there might be random
differences in individual preferences for taking on the
risks by, say, living on a fault line, but these should
show little variance between rich and poor, or black
and white. Disaster outcomes would thus be distrib-
uted more or less equally between groups. But in the
real world, where wealth is quite unevenly distrib-
uted and racial bias exists in access to jobs and other
income-earning opportunities, the wealth- or market-
based approach means that richer individuals, and
particular groups and classes, will get more of the
impure public good of disaster-vulnerability reduc-
tion than their poorer or less powerful counterparts.
This is exactly why a wealth-based approach—
which seems like a poor moral guideline for disasters—
has such considerable descriptive relevance. As the
world came to learn through images and then data,
those left stranded and most vulnerable by Hurricane
Katrina were disproportionately poor and dispropor-
tionately black.1 These disparately affected groups
lived in the lowest-lying areas of the city, and lacked
the private means of transportation to flee as the
storm approached. Similarly, casualties from the
powerful earthquake that hit Guatemala in 1976
were distributed so unevenly across that country’s
population—with most of the 22,000 deaths among
the poor and indigenous people—that the disaster was
dubbed a “class-quake” (Wisner et al. 2004, 279–81).
Their homes stood in landslide-susceptible ravines
and gorges, and they could not afford the earth-
quake-resistant construction that would have saved
their lives.
But the wealth- or market-based approach is by
no means confined to the descriptive realm of what
is. It also exerts a powerful influence, implicitly or
explicitly, on many policymakers’ prescriptions for
what ought to be. One famous (or infamous) exam-
ple is the 1992 memorandum in which then World
Bank chief economist Lawrence Summers posed
the question: “Just between you and me, shouldn’t
the World Bank be encouraging more migration 
of the dirty industries to the LDCs [less developed
countries]?” Among the justifications for such a pol-
icy, Summers wrote, was that
The measurement of the costs of health-impairing pol-
lution depends on the forgone earnings from increased
morbidity and mortality. From this point of view a given
amount of health-impairing pollution should be done
in the country with the lowest cost, which will be the
country with the lowest wages. I think the economic logic
of dumping a load of toxic waste in the lowest-wage
country is impeccable and we should face up to that.
Summers’s memorandum, which was leaked to
The Economist, was noteworthy not so much for the
viewpoint as for the frankness with which it was
expressed. In much the same vein, the wealth- or
market-based approach sometimes is invoked in the
literature on environmental justice to argue that there
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is nothing wrong with disparate risk burdens, as long
as they result from market dynamics and rational land-
use decisions.
Rejecting willingness-to-pay as the underlying basis
for social decisions on the allocation of risks does not
mean rejecting cost-benefit criteria altogether. Weigh-
ing the costs and benefits of alternative courses of
action is an inescapable task for public policy. Rather,
it means choosing a different strategy to aggregate ef-
fects across the population. Instead of putting weights
on different individuals on the implicit basis of their
respective purchasing power, policymakers can use
other, explicit principles to add total costs and ben-
efits aggregated across all individuals. For example,
they can assign equal weight to all, or even put greater
weight on those who are in greatest need.2
An alternative approach is based on the notion
that a clean and safe environment is a right held in
common by all, not a privilege to be distributed on
the basis of purchasing power (as indicated by ei-
ther real-world markets or the shadow markets of
benefit-cost analysis). Such a principle is, in fact,
enshrined in many constitutions and laws around
the world: the state constitution of Montana, for
example, says that “all persons are born free and
have certain inalienable rights. They include the
right to a clean and healthful environment,” and
the South African constitution says that “every per-
son shall have the right to an environment which is
not detrimental to his or her health or well-being.”
In short, the idea that environmental integrity
should be enjoyed by all has widespread normative
appeal. In the allocation of public-sector investments
for disaster-vulnerability reduction, such a rights-based
approach would place equal weight on mortality and
morbidity impacts across the population, regardless of
individual wealth and social status. The logic is similar
to that used both in voting and in the allocation of
basic legal rights: one person, one unit of protection
rather than one dollar, one unit of protection.3
Both the wealth- and rights-based approaches are
also relevant to understanding the legal and regulatory
structure that governs private-sector incentives for
mitigating risk. In the wealth-based framework, in-
dividual households are seen as choosing their risk
level based on willingness to pay; they thus bear the
burden of obtaining (or not obtaining) insurance
against these risks, and any undue or unexpected bur-
dens that arise from firm decisions to pollute or engage
in hazardous behavior are to be settled through filing
claims against those firms. This creates an incentive
structure for firms to locate environmental external-
ities where they expect that insurance levels will be
low, monetary losses will be minimal, and litigation
will be less likely. This is a recipe for targeting those
with the least power in the social calculus.
In the rights-based framework, any infringement
on the right to a safe and clean environment would
constitute legal grounds for claims for restitution.
Under such a framework, private firms would seek to
insure themselves against any resident claims—and the
more unsafe the facility, the higher the price of insur-
ance. This weighting would allow the insurance sector
to play a more central role in safeguarding against
man-made disasters: even if the people whose safety
is at risk cannot afford insurance, it would be the re-
sponsibility of the owners of facilities that jeopardize
public safety to insure against risks to lives and health.
Although our legal system seems to have a bit of
each of these elements, with residents and firms bat-
tling over liability, the difference in legal and other
assets between poor communities and wealthy com-
panies puts more onus on the former than on the lat-
ter to take preventive action—by, say, moving away
rather than by reducing pollution. In a rights-based
framework, more responsibility would lie with the pol-
luter; as a result, the incentive structure would work
toward both the reduction of risk overall and a more
equitable distribution of risk across populations.
The Environmental Justice Framework
That the acute risks of disaster might be distributed
unequally seems unfair to many observers, partly
because there is a strong normative sense that catas-
trophes could befall us all and that the provision of
emergency services should therefore also be equally
distributed. Yet the pictures of those who evacuated
and those who were left behind in the Katrina disaster
suggest a sort of auction for rescue that reflects the
privileges of wealth more than it does the equal rights
of the citizenry.
Such an inequitable distribution of risks on an on-
going basis has been a central concern of the environ-
mental justice perspective. Originally a reaction to
the siting of hazards in minority neighborhoods, the
environmental justice movement has grown markedly
in recent decades. Firmly rooted in the rights-based
approach, specific principles of the environmental
justice framework include
• The right of all individuals to be protected from envi-
ronmental degradation. This stems from a civil rights
framework rooted in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
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Fair Housing Act of 1968, the Voting Rights Act of
1965, and even the 1948 United Nations Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which recognizes
that people everywhere have intrinsic rights to life
and health, and to a healthy environment (United
Nations 2004).
• Prevention as the preferred public health strategy. In the
environmental justice framework, affected commu-
nities should not have to wait until causation or con-
clusive proof is established before preventive action
is taken. For example, the framework shifts the pri-
mary focus of childhood lead issues from treatment
(after children have been poisoned) to prevention
(elimination of the threat via abating lead in houses).
• The allocation of the burden of proof toward polluters-
dischargers rather than affected communities. Under a
traditional regulatory system, individuals who chal-
lenge polluters must prove that they have been harmed,
discriminated against, or disproportionately impacted.
Few affected communities have the resources to hire
lawyers, expert witnesses, and doctors needed to sus-
tain such a challenge—and the environmental justice
framework attempts to level the playing field by re-
quiring polluters to prove the absence of harm rather
than disprove allegations of harm.
• The need to redress disproportionate impact through
targeted action and resources. This has become a source
of controversy in recent years as the Bush administra-
tion has insisted that environmental justice is about
protecting “all people.” Indeed, it is, but targeting
resources where environmental and health problems
are greatest and social resilience may be lowest—that
is, poorer and more minority communities—is simple
common sense (Pastor, Gallegos, and Prichard 2005;
Bullard 1994, 237–66).
• The idea that communities “speak for themselves.”
Although traditional environmental policy making is
often made by a sort of battle of competing experts,
the EJ perspective insists that those who are most af-
fected by the pollution should have a central voice in
the regulatory process. Thus, there is a heavy empha-
sis on community participation, neighborhood au-
tonomy, and democratic decision making.
Environmental justice principles may seem a long
way from current practice. Worldwide, the dominant
environmental protection paradigm institutionalizes
unequal enforcement, places the burden of proof on
the victims and not the polluting industry, and creates
an industry around risk assessment and risk manage-
ment that fails to develop pollution prevention as
the overarching and dominant strategy (Bullard 2000,
2005). Yet there have been major policy inroads, in-
cluding the adoption in 1994 of Presidential Exec-
utive Order 12898, “Federal Actions to Address
Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and
Low-Income Populations.”
Executive Order 12898 reinforced the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, Title VI, which prohibits discriminatory
practices in programs receiving federal funds. It called
for improved methodologies for assessing and miti-
gating impacts from multiple and cumulative expo-
sure, and improved collection of data on low-income
and minority populations that may be disproportion-
ately at risk. It also, and significantly, encouraged
participation of the impacted populations in the var-
ious phases of assessing impacts—including scoping,
data gathering, alternatives, analysis, mitigation, and
monitoring. Most fundamentally, it directed each
federal agency to “make achieving environmental
justice part of its mission” and specifically identified
racial minority and low-income communities as areas
of potential concern.
In the years since, environmental justice has come
to gain a specific, albeit limited, place in the regula-
tory world. The U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, for example, defines environmental justice as
the “fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all
people regardless of race, color, national origin, or in-
come with respect to the development, implemen-
tation, and enforcement of environmental laws,
regulations and policies. Fair treatment means that no
group of people—including racial, ethnic, or socio-
economic groups—should bear a disproportionate
share of the negative environmental consequences re-
sulting from industrial, municipal, and commercial
operations or the execution of federal, state, local, and
tribal programs and policies” (U.S. EPA 1998, 1).
This vision clashes with the current state of environ-
mental quality and equality. Some areas are greener
than others, some areas have more hazards than others,
and the decision of who lives where, particularly given
entrenched housing segregation, is not simply driven
by choice (Farley, Danziger, and Holzer 2002; Frazier,
Margai, and Tettey-Fio 2003). Minorities are likely
to bear greater health and environmental risks in their
homes, schools, and neighborhoods, as well as in
their workplaces (Institute of Medicine 1999). And
the connection of race, place, and the environment
is deep: in a recent study of all metro areas in the
United States, Rachel Morello-Frosch and Bill Jesdale
(2006) found a persistent relationship between in-
creasing levels of racial-ethnic segregation and in-
creased estimated cancer risk associated with ambient
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air toxics across racial lines. Segregation, moreover,
solidifies racial disparities in socioeconomic status
(SES), and shapes the distribution of resources and
wealth at the individual, household, and community
levels that can affect access to health services to mit-
igate the increased environmental risk.
But it is more than just risk at play: the intersection
of race and place affects access to jobs, education and
public services, culture, shopping, level of personal
security, medical services, transportation, and residen-
tial amenities such as parks and green space (Bullard,
Johnson, and Torres 2000; Dreier, Mollenkoph, and
Swanstrom 2001). This has been one of the telling as-
pects of the environmental justice movement in recent
years: the adoption of a broad notion of the environ-
ment that includes a critique of the very nature of our
contemporary urban form of sprawling suburbs and
struggling cities, and how this shapes opportunity.
Disaster Vulnerability and Environmental Justice
The disaster vulnerability literature focuses on acute
risks posed by one-time events. The environmental
justice literature focuses on chronic risks posed by the
day-to-day actions of polluters. As in public health,
the chronic-acute distinction is a continuum, not a
sharp break: as chronic exposure rises, acute effects
become more prevalent. In both cases, the results
are ill-health and death.
The social dynamics that underlie the dispropor-
tionate environmental hazards faced by low-income
communities and minorities also play out in the arena
of disaster prevention, mitigation, and recovery. In
a sense, environmental justice is about slow-motion
disasters—and disasters reveal environmental injus-
tice in a fast-forward mode. Both revolve around the
axes of disparities of wealth and power.
Lack of wealth heightens the risks that individuals
and communities face for three reasons. First, it trans-
lates into a lack of purchasing power to secure private
alternatives to public provision of a clean and safe en-
vironment for all. Second, it translates into less ability
to withstand shocks (such as health bills and property
damage) that wealth would cushion. Third, it trans-
lates through the “shadow prices” of cost-benefit
analysis into public policies that place a lower priority
on protecting “less valuable” people and their assets.
The wealth-hazard relationship cuts both ways: haz-
ards also reduce the wealth of individuals and com-
munities. This is most evident when disasters damage
or destroy property. But there are also asset losses that
occur during post-disaster recovery and reconstruc-
tion, when property changes hands from those who
have less to those who have more. In the wake of the
December 2004 tsunami in coastal Thailand, for ex-
ample, powerful land grabbers arrived on the scene to
take advantage of the weakened circumstances of the
local residents (Vatikiotis 2005; Montlake 2005). In
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Race-Ethnicity
• Damaged areas were 45.8 percent African American,
undamaged areas only 26.4 percent. For the city of
New Orleans alone, these figures were 75.0 percent
and 46.2 percent, respectively.
• Before Katrina, the city had 475,000 people with
about 67 percent African American. Current esti-
mates indicate that soon the population will be only
350,000 with only 35 to 40 percent black.
• Approximately 24,000 legal permanent residents,
72,000 legal temporary residents, and an estimated
20,000 to 35,000 undocumented immigrants may
have been affected by Katrina (Woods and Lewis
2005, 8).
• Around the time of Katrina, poor blacks were much
less likely to have access to cars than even poor
whites, 53 versus 17 percent (Dyson 2006, 145).
Poverty
• Damaged areas had 20.9 percent of households liv-
ing below the federal poverty line, undamaged areas
only 15.3 percent. For the city of New Orleans
alone, these figures were 29.2 percent and 24.7 per-
cent, respectively.
• In the city of New Orleans, before Katrina hit,
women had much higher poverty rates than men,
with 2004 figures of 25.9 percent and 20.0 percent
(Gault et al. 2005).
• Damaged areas had 45.7 percent renter-occupied
households, undamaged areas only 30.9 percent.
Race, Class, and Katrina
Note: All data not directly cited to another source comes from John Logan (2006).
the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, there is a similar
risk. Asset transfers could turn New Orleans into a
little more than a theme park for affluent tourists. In
the vicious circle of disaster vulnerability, those with
less wealth face greater risks, and when disaster
strikes their wealth is further sapped.
But risk is not just about money: as we will see, even
middle-class African Americans, Latinos, and Asians
face elevated environmental risks. This reflects sys-
tematic differences in power and the legacy of racial
discrimination. Power also shows up in private deci-
sions by firms choosing where to site hazards and how
much to invest in environmental protection: their
choices are constrained not only by government reg-
ulations, but also by informal governance exercised
by mobilized communities, civil society, and the press
(see Pargal et al. 1997; Boyce 2004). In both public
and private arenas, then, power disparities drive out-
come disparities—and the resulting patterns reflect
race and ethnicity as well as wealth.4
Rights are not cast in stone: they are redefined and
reassigned in light of society’s values and perceived
needs. Clashes between the principle that everyone
has an equal right to a clean and safe environment and
the reality that access to a clean and safe environment
is rationed by wealth and power can help to propel
demand for change. By bringing this contrast into
sharp relief, an event like Hurricane Katrina can be-
come a catalyst for rethinking both environmental
protection and disaster preparedness.
The belief that all individuals should have equal
opportunity to exercise power and to influence public
policy, regardless of wealth, race, ethnicity, or gender
is deeply rooted in public discourse, legislation, and
case law in the United States. Although the gap be-
tween what laws and legislation say and what is ac-
tually done often remains large, the past two centuries
have seen great strides toward making this vision a
reality in America and across the world. Progress in
implementing environmental justice and equal pro-
tection from disasters can carry us forward on the
historic march towards a more level playing field—
one in which we realize more fully shared American
values of fairness, opportunity, and democracy.
ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY:
DEBATE AND EVIDENCE
Much as Katrina awakened the country to long-
standing problems of differential disaster vulnerability,
it was a landmark event back in 1982 that highlighted
long-standing patterns of environmental injustice: a
decision by the state of North Carolina to place a land-
fill for hazardous wastes in Warren County, the poor-
est county in the state and one with a population
that was 65 percent African American. Community
protests led to the arrest of 500 people and placed the
issue of the environment squarely in the tradition of
the civil rights movement (Geiser and Waneck 1994).
The Warren County protests launched a wave of
research on the location of environmental hazards.
The early work seemed to confirm the community
wisdom. For example, a U.S. General Accounting
Office study, prompted by the controversy in Warren
County (in fact, it was requested by a congressman
arrested in the protests), found that hazardous waste
landfills in the southern states were disproportionately
located in black communities (1983). A subsequent
study of zip code areas by the Commission for Racial
Justice of the United Church of Christ (UCC) estab-
lished that hazardous waste and toxic disposal facilities
across the country were correlated with the proportion
of African American residents (1987). And shortly
after the early GAO and UCC studies, a National
Argonne Laboratory study reported that 57 percent
of whites, 65 percent of blacks, and 80 percent of
Latinos lived in counties that failed to meet at least one
of the EPA’s ambient air quality standards (Wernette
and Nieves 1992). This large-scale statistical research
was backed up by a series of influential case studies,
documenting disparities for blacks in the South
and Gulf Coast (Bullard 1990a; Wright, Bryant, and
Bullard 1994).
By 1990, the combination of research and activism
began to provoke changes in environmental thinking
and policy. Following a research conference on envi-
ronmental justice held at the University of Michigan,
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, under
the administration of President George H. W. Bush,
created an Environmental Equity Working Group
that brought together researchers, activists, and pol-
icymakers (see Lester, Allen, and Hill 2001, 30;
Bryant and Mohai 1992). The subsequent establish-
ment of an Office of Environmental Equity (subse-
quently renamed the Office of Environmental
Justice), and the 1992 release of the EPA report
Environmental Equity: Reducing Risk for All Com-
munities, signaled the growing acceptance of the
basic precepts of the research demonstrating dispar-
ities. “Racial minority and low-income populations,”
the report concluded, “experience higher than aver-
age exposures to selected air pollutants, hazardous
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waste facilities, contaminated fish and agricultural
pesticides in the workplace.”5 Although it noted that
such exposure did not always translate into docu-
mented health effects, the report expressed concern
about disparities and the EPA promised to better
document and incorporate the distribution of risk
into its decision making. The incoming Clinton ad-
ministration picked up the momentum generated
under President Bush, and in 1994 issued Executive
Order No. 12898, mandating environmental justice
as part of the federal government’s mission.
Yet just as the government was beginning to act, a
new set of research studies began to question both the
existence of environmental disparities and the rationale
for policy attention. Some researchers challenged
the large-scale statistical work, suggesting that there
were not statistically significant differences by race and
ethnicity after controlling for other determinants of
the location of facilities (Anderton, Anderson, Rossi
et al. 1994; Anderton, Anderson, Oakes, and Fraser
1994).6 Other researchers disparaged the explanatory
power of case studies and suggested that the focus
on race stemmed from political concerns rather than
concerns about environmental and health policy
(Foreman 1998).
Reaction to the perceived pattern of inequality
had, in short, bred a counterreaction. Yet in recent
years a growing body of evidence, based on rigorous
methods and sophisticated statistical techniques, has
demonstrated that race is indeed strongly correlated
with environmental quality. This quantitative work
continues to be complemented by important case
studies that illuminate the underlying political and
social processes that generate these environmental
disparities. Competing explanations for the existence
of environmental inequality have surfaced in the course
of this research.
Why Environmental Inequity? Land, Markets,
and Power
Explanations for the pattern of environmental hazards
fall into three categories: rational land-use planning,
market dynamics, and the exercise of power. The ra-
tional land use explanation suggests that hazards are
located in areas based largely on compatibility of use:
landfills should be in more rural areas, transfer facil-
ities in urban areas, industrial plants near transport
corridors, hazardous waste facilities near industrial
plants, and so on. Because detailed land-use measures
are few and far between in the literature (for excep-
tions, see Boer et al. 1997; Morello-Frosch, Pastor,
and Sadd 2001; Pastor, Sadd, and Morello-Frosch
2005a), many researchers have used proxies such as
population density or the proximity of a manufac-
turing workforce. The inclusion of such variables in
any analysis can help distinguish between biased sit-
ing and rational planning.
The market dynamics explanation suggests that
placing environmental disamenities in lower income
areas has a market logic. First, lower income may be
correlated with lower land values: because accurate
data on land values is hard to obtain at the census tract
level, household income acts as a proxy for land prices.
Second, lower-income residents may be willing to
trade off health risks for cheaper housing: what looks
like an environmental disparity is thus really a reflection
of preferences based on market choice. Third, miti-
gation costs—say, for forgone income from health-
related problems—would be less in low-income areas:
businesses thus find it cost-efficient to locate pollu-
tion sources there.7
The power explanation suggests that low-income
people and communities of color are systematically dis-
advantaged in the political decision-making process.
This argument can incorporate the other explanations:
what seems to be rational land use, after all, may be
predetermined by political processes that designate
disenfranchised communities as sacrifice zones (see
Pulido 2000; Boone and Modarres 1999; Wright
2005). Indeed, land use decisions often build on
accumulated disadvantage. In the largely Latino com-
munity Kettleman City in California’s Central Valley,
for example, an effort to place a toxic waste incinerator
in a landfill already proximate to the city was viewed
as building on existing disamenities but added insult
to injury for an already overburdened community
(Cole and Foster 2001). Likewise, income is a marker
of political power as well as of market strength.
The interplay of land use, income, and power means
that certain variables used in statistical analyses—such
as zoning and household wealth—carry multiple ex-
planations. To demonstrate convincingly that power
is behind siting decisions requires the inclusion of
some variables that are directly and irrefutably con-
nected to power differentials.
The most important of these variables is race.8 Dis-
parate patterns by race, particularly when one has
controlled for income and other variables involved
in the land-use and market-dynamics explanations,
most clearly point to the role of unequal influence and
racial discrimination. Racially disparate outcomes are
also important in their own right. They can result
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from processes that are not so much a direct exercise
of power as essentially embedded in the nature of our
urban form, including housing segregation and real
estate steering, informal methods that exclude com-
munities from decision-making processes (including
less provision of information regarding health risks),
the past placement of hazards (which justifies new
hazards as rational land use), and other forms of less
direct “institutionalized” or “structural” racism (see
Feagin and Feagin 1986; Institute on Race and Pov-
erty 2002). And it is precisely racialized risk that has
galvanized a movement for environmental equity
rooted in civil rights law and activism. Race and racism
therefore are at the heart of the evidentiary debate.
Studies of which came first can also test the relative
strength of the land use, market, and power-race
explanations. Do environmental disparities reflect
biases in the siting of hazards, or are they the result
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The day before Hurricane Katrina hit, Debra was at
her job as a nurse’s aide at a New Orleans hospital.
Her supervisor encouraged his employees to take shel-
ter during the storm at the hospital with their family
members. Debra felt so lucky. She was a single mother
of a nine-year-old girl, had few resources, and no way
to get out of town. The hospital would be perfect, she
thought. She packed up her daughter, Cierra, but
Debra’s sister and her eighty-year-old stepmother re-
fused to leave their New Orleans home. I’m too old for
that, her stepmother told her, and Debra could not
convince them to come.
At first, the hospital seemed like a safe spot for shel-
ter, but soon the water in the streets rose, the power
went out, the halls were pitch black, and the hospital
was unbearably hot. People were screaming in the
streets and the trees were smashing against the large
hospital windows. The people were screaming and the
trees were screaming, too, she recalled later. Water started
to rise in the hospital basement, food and drinking
water were running out, and people were scared. She
explained, it felt like the world was coming to an end. At
several points, in the darkness, she could not find her
daughter. Yet the staff kept working. Debra passed
nurses fanning a newborn baby, doctors giving oxygen
manually, patients begging for help. These are things
you don’t want your child to see, Debra said sadly.
The hospital staff had to administer drugs and read
charts with only the light of a small flashlight. Later,
her supervisor informed them that they would have to
“close the door” on some patients because there was
nothing left that they could do for them. She was
shaken, but knew he was right. Eventually, thankfully,
Debra and her daughter were airlifted out of the hos-
pital on a helicopter, and then were placed on a bus.
People were screaming, crying, people were throwing up,
passing out, dying, she recounted. Eventually, they ar-
rived at the Cajundome mass shelter in Lafayette,
Louisiana. Amidst the thousands of evacuees, they
rested on their cots, exhausted, fearful, and sad. It was
hard to believe that they had gotten out, but now they
had to figure out what to do next. She thought about
how they had all been treated: They didn’t care about
any of us. . . . Where are our civil rights?
Then Hurricane Rita hit, and they evacuated again,
but then returned to the Cajundome. Like all the
other Cajundome guests, they filled out forms, waited
for housing, and passed through the metal detectors
every time they came in the door. They accepted a few
donated clothes and stored them in a box under their
cots. During that time they learned that Debra’s elderly
stepmother and sister had gotten out of their home on
a mattress floating on the floodwaters, and eventually
ended up in the New Orleans Superdome. We were so
scared, they told her.
Debra’s home was lost, as well as her job as a nurse’s
aide, because the hospital was destroyed, and she had
no savings. Finally, in mid-October, her name was
called over the Cajundome intercom. She was to report
to the main offices immediately. There, she received
the news that one of the new FEMA trailers being set
up on a dog racing track parking lot outside of
Lafayette would be hers temporarily. She was thrilled
by the news. This is the first time I have truly smiled since
the hurricane, she proclaimed. Debra and Cierra are
now living in the trailer and Cierra goes to school, but
they are still adjusting and do not feel settled. Debra
finds it hard to talk about what happened, and often
thinks: This actually happened. Sometimes you want to
wake up and think it’s a dream.
Debra’s Story
Note: This vignette is taken from a research project on Hurricane Katrina conducted by Professor Alice Fothergill, University of
Vermont, and Professor Lori Peek, Colorado State University. The results of this study are unpublished. “Debra” is a pseudonym
to protect the identity of the interviewee. As a single mother in New Orleans, Debra is not alone. More than half of New Orleans’
families with related children are headed by single females (56 percent of all families with children under eighteen in New Orleans,
versus 25.2 percent of such families for the nation as a whole). See Gault et al. (2005, 3).
of post-siting decisions by minorities and low-income
residents lured, perhaps, by falling property values,
to decide to move into neighborhoods marked by
higher exposure and risk? Evidence that siting is more
important than move-in could square with an ex-
planation focused on power and institutionalized
racism; evidence that move-in is more important
would support the idea that disparities are simply the
result of market dynamics.9
In understanding the patterns, both large-scale
statistical studies and case studies are critical: the
broader studies can illustrate the general pattern and
case analysis can help unpack the patterns with blow-
by-blow histories that elucidate the motivations of
polluters, the resistance of communities, and the in-
centives facing decision makers. Because much of the
more recent research in environmental justice has
emphasized large sample quantitative work, we focus
here on that; when we turn to disaster vulnerability,
we rely more on the case method.
Environmental Inequality: The Evidence
The early GAO and UCC studies, and a 1992 National
Argonne Laboratory study all suggested that envi-
ronmental inequality was rampant, and a series of
important case studies provided back-up. Bullard’s
landmark volume Dumping in Dixie (Bullard 1990a)
reviewed both siting decisions and community mobi-
lization in southern black communities, and found
strong evidence of racial disparity. Sociologist Beverly
Wright and others documented the rise of the petro-
chemical corridor between Baton Rouge and New
Orleans and its impact on poor African American
“fenceline communities” (Wright et al. 1994; Adeola
1998). Activists in Barrio Logan, a predominantly
Latino community in San Diego, noted that one-third
of chemical waste in the entire county was generated
in their small neighborhood (Kay 1994, 162). Native
Americans began to voice concerns about their reser-
vations becoming the dumping grounds for toxic and
radioactive waste (Churchill and LaDuke 1986).10
And minority communities in northern cities such as
Boston and New York began to complain of aban-
doned and polluted “brownfields,” poor management
of nearby sewage treatment, the rising epidemic of
child asthma, and other environmental issues.
In the mid-1990s, however, a series of new studies
argued that: one, the scale of previous analyses—
usually the zip code—was inappropriate for consider-
ing neighborhoods, and that census tracts were to be
preferred as neighborhood proxies; and, two, simple
correlations between race and hazards did not take
into account market and land use dynamics and the
use of appropriate multivariate techniques tended to
refute conclusions of racial disparities (Anderton,
Anderson, Rossi et al. 1994; Anderton, Anderson,
Oakes, and Fraser 1994).11
The most important of the refutations, the studies
by Anderton and his colleagues, have now found
themselves challenged on different methodological
grounds. The first is the authors’ decision to restrict
their national analysis to metropolitan areas that had
at least one commercial hazardous waste facility. A sub-
sequent study by Vicki Been (1995) used the same
basic variables but avoided this selection bias and
found evidence of racial and income disparities. A
second issue involves the authors’ decision to high-
light findings only for the census tracts hosting trans-
fer storage and disposal facilities. As J. Michael Oakes,
a member of the Anderton team, noted in his 1997
doctoral dissertation, considering the more densely
populated neighborhoods surrounding these tracts,
an approach that has become standard in the field,
yields significant evidence of racial disparity (see also
Mohai and Saha 2006).12 A third issue is that the use
of multivariate techniques does not give researchers
free rein to include as many covariates as possible;
the likely result of that approach is collinearity, which
will eliminate statistical significance (see the critique
in Boer et al. 1997).13
Indeed, more recent research has tended to re-
inforce the basic conclusions of the early studies.
A national analysis by three researchers who were ini-
tially skeptical of environmental inequality claims
found evidence of disparities by both race and class,
showing that these were sensitive to the geographic
scale used (Lester, Allen, and Hill 2001). And though
some researchers have argued that the existence of
environmental inequality depends on which region is
being examined, a recent national study on toxic air
emissions from large industrial facilities that statistically
controlled for regional variations, found sharp racial
and ethnic disparities in pollution burdens, even after
taking income and other variables into account (Ash
and Fetter 2004). The authors note that not only are
African Americans concentrated in the most polluted
metropolitan areas, but also that within any given
area they tend to live in the most polluted neighbor-
hoods. Latinos are concentrated in metropolitan
areas with lower pollution burdens, but within these
areas they too tend to live on “the wrong side” of the
environmental tracks.
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A recent meta-analysis by Evan Rinquist (2005)
examined forty-nine empirical studies (including the
studies of Anderton and his colleagues) and used
newly developed regression techniques to assess com-
mon inequity patterns in the various research efforts.14
The analysis suggests that evidence of racial disparity
in environmental hazard burdens exists regardless of
“the type of risk examined, the level of aggregation
employed, or the type of control variables used in the
analysis” (233). The author concluded that though
“some scholars have protested that race-based in-
equities are limited in scope, produced by misspecified
models, or are artifacts of aggregation bias . . . protests
claiming that these factors can explain away such in-
equities are empirically unsustainable” (241).
Rinquist suggests, however, that the racial dispari-
ties, though statistically significant, are small, making
use of Jacob Cohen’s (1988) standard for estimating
impacts across different studies. But that conclusion
may be problematic for two reasons. First, as Rinquist
notes, the effects are actually large in those studies
that use distance-based methods—that is, that take
into account the location of a facility and include
census tracts by proximity rather than by whether the
facility is in the tract itself. In a forthcoming paper
that echoes the Oakes discussion of adjoining tracts.
Paul Mohai and Robin Saha (2006) show that the
distance-based approach is analytically superior be-
cause hazards are often on the borders of tracts (per-
haps because they are on transit corridors); indeed,
the authors use data from a previous national study
to demonstrate the a tract-oriented approach would
miss evidence of racial and income disparity, whereas
a distance-based approach confirms the racial dispar-
ity hypothesis in both simple comparisons and multi-
variate analysis.
Second, the Rinquist conclusion of a small race
effect neglects cumulative impacts. Studies have now
found disparities in proximity to a range of potential
hazards, including treatment, storage, transfer and
disposal facilities, the industrial facilities reporting to
the EPA’s Toxics Release Inventory (TRI), Superfund
sites, and estimates of cancer risk from stationary and
mobile source pollution. Assuming that these burdens
are additive—and detailed analysis of various hot
spots in major urban areas suggests exactly such a
clustering—then small differences in each of these
dimensions could add up to a large difference in envi-
ronmental quality. To paraphrase the late Senator
Everett Dirksen: “A little overexposure here, a little
overexposure there, and pretty soon you’re talking
about real disparity.”
Turning to the effects of income, Rinquist notes
that the findings are mixed. This is not surprising. In
very low-income areas with little economic activity,
there are few nearby sources of pollution from indus-
try, commerce, or transport. On the other hand, at
very high levels of income, residents have the political
power to resist unwanted land uses. Thus we might
expect a nonlinear relationship in which pollution
burdens peak at income levels somewhere in the mid-
dle range (Been and Gupta 1997; Boer et al. 1997;
Sadd et al. 1999; Morello-Frosch, Pastor, and Sadd
2001). And this complex mix of income effects—
particularly in light of the consistent effects of race—
is more a challenge for the market dynamics argument
than it is for the power-based set of explanations.
Research on the temporal dimension—which came
first, the minority communities or the hazards?—has
been the subject of a more limited range of quanti-
tative research, primarily because of the methodolog-
ical challenges of such time-series analysis.15 The
results have been mixed. In keeping with the work of
Douglas Anderton and various colleagues (Anderton,
Anderson, Rossi et al. 1994; Anderton, Anderson,
Oakes, and Fraser 1994), John Oakes, Douglas
Anderton, and Andy Anderson (1996) found little
evidence of either contemporary disparity or historical
patterns. Using an improved database, Vicki Been
and Francis Gupta (1997) found no evidence for the
move-in view but did find some that Latino commu-
nities were the subject of disproportionate siting.16
Sabina Shaikh and John Loomis (1999) found in a
study of Denver that minority populations rose faster
in areas without hazards, countering the market dy-
namics view. James Mitchell, Deborah Thomas,
and Susan Cutter (1999) find evidence of minority
move-in for South Carolina. A study of the Los
Angeles area by Manuel Pastor, James Sadd, and
John Hipp (2001) found that siting was significantly
disproportionate, and that the movement of minori-
ties into affected neighborhoods was no faster than
in the rest of the region.17
Although the evidence is more muddled in this tem-
poral arena, it does suggest little support for the move-
in hypothesis and some limited support for the
disproportionate siting hypothesis. In a recent article,
Saha and Mohai (2005) help to resolve the muddle
by noting that siting processes may change over time.
They suggest that disparate siting was on the rise after
the 1970s, when a combination of environmental
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legislation, NIMBY (“Not In My Backyard”) atti-
tudes, and the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act of 1976 made it more “politically rational” to try
to site environmental hazards in neighborhoods with
less influence. They find empirical evidence of this in
Michigan. This shift in the temporal dynamic may
also help explain why environmental justice concerns
emerged so vigorously in the 1980s and 1990s.
In cases where minorities have seemingly moved
to places of higher risk, case studies reveal that the
story is often more complex. For example, two almost
entirely black New Orleans subdivisions, Press Park
and Gordon Plaza, were built on the Agriculture
Street Landfill, a site used as a municipal dump for
more than fifty years, and one that included debris
from Hurricane Betsy in 1965 (Lyttle 2004; Wright
2005). Both subdivisions emerged from a federally
subsidized program in the 1970s to encourage
lower income families to purchase their first home,
with the development undertaken in cooperation
with the Housing Authority of New Orleans.
In 1983, the Orleans Parish School Board pur-
chased another portion of the Agriculture Street
Landfill site for a school. The board contracted en-
gineering firms to survey the site and found evidence
of heavy metals and organics. In May 1986, EPA per-
formed a site inspection and—despite the lead, zinc,
mercury, cadmium, and arsenic found—determined
that the site was not problematic enough to be placed
on the National Priorities List for toxic-waste clean-
up. The Moton Elementary School opened on the
site with 421 students in 1989. In December 1990,
EPA published a revised hazard scoring system in
response to the Superfund Amendment and Re-
authorization Act of 1986. Upon the request of com-
munity leaders, an expanded site inspection was
conducted in September 1993. The soil was found to
contain 149 toxins, forty-four of them carcinogenic,
and in December 1994 the community was placed
on the National Priorities List.
The Agriculture Street Landfill community, home
to a low- to middle-income population that is around
97 percent African American, pushed for a buy-out
of their property and relocation of residents. Instead,
EPA ordered a clean-up that began in 1998 and was
completed in 2001—one that residents contend was
more expensive than a community preferred option
of a buy-out (Lyttle 2004).
This case suggests that even when move-in has
occurred, it can hide a history of public policies based
on misleading or inaccurate information. Ironically,
the environmental damage wrought by Katrina may
force the cleanup and relocation of the Agriculture
Street Landfill community, the goal many residents
had been seeking since finding out about the toxins
under their homes.
In sum, research, methodologically bolstered in
response to the useful challenges by critics, seems to
confirm the ubiquity of environmental inequalities
revealed in the first watershed studies (GAO 1983;
United Church of Christ 1987). It is said that the first
step of a program to eliminate addiction is to admit
you have a problem. In a society seemingly hooked
on putting hazards in the backyards of those already
burdened by poverty and racial discrimination, own-
ing up to the reality would make a good starting
place for policy making.
Does Environmental Inequality Matter? 
Risk and Policy
Inequalities in health that are unexplained by income
levels or insurance coverage (see Smedley, Stith, and
Nelson 2003) have led some to wonder about the
role of environmental disparities. The disparity con-
cern is especially sharp with regard to children’s envi-
ronmental health, particularly in view of a growing
body of scientific evidence indicating that children are
more susceptible than adults to the adverse effects of
environmental pollution because of fundamental dif-
ferences in their physiology, metabolism, exposure,
and absorption patterns (see Bearer 1995; Guzelian,
Henry, and Olin 1992; Landrigan and Garg 2002).18
One dramatic environmental issue is childhood lead
poisoning, a preventable disease that continues to
pose the number one environmental health threat to
black children in the United States, especially those
living in inner cities with concentration of older hous-
ing with lead paint (see Kraft and Scheberle 1995).
Black children are five times more likely than white
children to have lead poisoning. Although the pat-
tern partly reflects lower incomes and older housing,
nearly 30 percent of all low-income black children are
lead poisoned versus fewer than 10 percent of their
white counterparts. And the effects are quite real: re-
cent studies supported by the National Institute for
Environmental Health Sciences suggest that a young
person’s lead burden is linked to lower IQ, lower high
school graduation rates, and increased delinquency
(Shannon et al. 2005; Needleman 2004).
Although some causal chains from hazard to health,
such as that for lead, are relatively well established,
linking environmental pollution to adverse health
effects is an ongoing challenge, particularly when
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populations are chronically exposed to complex,
chemical mixtures (Institute of Medicine 1999). Epi-
demiological studies and risk assessment help eluci-
date whether documented disparities have potential
health implications, and help to prioritize which
hazards should be minimized and at what costs.
Risk assessment and prioritization are important.
Finding, for example, that the vast majority of haz-
ardous air pollutants emerge from mobile rather than
stationary sources could lead one to focus on cleaner
vehicles versus cleaner plants. But a focus on risk as-
sessment should be nuanced. First, some risks are
imposed and others are chosen. It may be that an ef-
fective antismoking campaign could yield more anti-
cancer bang for the buck than an effort to curtail
emissions of certain chemicals at a manufacturing
facility. But the risks taken by smokers are voluntary,
and those taken by residents nearby the facility are
often not.
Second, even if a particular source contributes
more to total risk, it does not necessarily follow that
focusing on its reduction meets fairness criteria. For
example, in California’s South Coast Air Basin, a
market-based plan to decrease traffic emissions
through the purchase and disposal of older, higher
emitting vehicles was proposed to offset emissions
by large petrochemical facilities involved in unload-
ing tankers in the Port of Los Angeles. Backers of this
mobile-to-stationary emissions trading plan argued
that it would have a bigger impact on decreasing air
pollution region wide, but communities living near
the port successfully fought the plan by arguing that
it could create a toxic hot spot in an area already
impacted by polluting sources (Chinn 1999).
Despite the limitations of risk assessment as a
regulatory and policy tool, this methodology has
been useful when applied in a comparative frame-
work in environmental justice studies. For example,
recent work has compared estimates of lifetime 
cancer risk associated with air toxics exposures.
Figure 1 shows how this estimated risk varies by
race and income in Southern California (Morello-
Frosch et al. 2001). Particularly notable is that
though the risk declines as income rises, it is con-
sistently higher at all income levels for African
Americans, Latinos, and Asians.19
Other risks that concern environmental justice
communities include respiratory hazards and vulner-
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FIGURE 1 Distribution of Estimated Risk from Ambient Hazardous Air Pollutant Exposures,
Southern California
ability to asthma attacks. Asthma prevalence and
mortality are three times higher among minorities
than among whites (National Heart, Lung, and
Blood Institute Working Group 1995; Persky et al.
1998). African American and Latino children are
three to five times more likely to die from asthma
than white children (Frumkin, Frank, and Jackson
2004; see also Metzer, Delgado, and Herrell 1995).
Asthma disparities between whites and minorities
persist even after controlling for income (Litonjua
et al. 1999), and there is some evidence that such
disparities are correlated with differing air toxics lev-
els (Pastor, Sadd, and Morello-Frosch 2005b).
Health outcome patterns result not only from the
cumulative impacts of environmental stressors but
also from what is termed social vulnerability. Living
in hazardous, deprived, and segregated neighbor-
hoods that lack resources and have weakened social
networks leads to chronic stress, which ultimately
degrades health and well-being (Geronimus 2000;
Schultz et al. 2002) and heightens biological vulner-
ability to the adverse health effects of toxic exposures
(Gee and Payne-Sturges 2004; Morello-Frosch and
Lopez 2005; O’Neill et al. 2003). The impacts of
these intersecting individual-level and community-
level processes are manifested through specific health
outcomes, such as asthma, cancer, infant mortality,
diabetes, and other diseases that are both socially and
environmentally mediated.
Of course, risk is a fact of modern life. But what the
environmental justice framework raises is the moral
question posed when such risk is systematically dis-
tributed along characteristics such as race.
How have policymakers responded to this growing
body of evidence and community concern? In the
1990s, various federal agencies developed their own
environmental justice initiatives, and some states,
such as California, worked to integrate environmen-
tal justice concerns in regulatory enforcement and re-
search activities (Bonorris 2004). These steps were a
response to political pressure to change a record of
disparities in regulatory programs. For example, a
1992 National Law Journal study uncovered glaring
inequities in the way the EPA enforces its laws, not-
ing that white communities got faster action and bet-
ter results, with stiffer penalties for polluters, than did
black and minority communities, even accounting for
income (Lavelle and Coyle 1992).
Unfortunately, progress at the EPA has faltered
under the President George W. Bush administra-
tion. A March 2004 EPA Office of Inspector
General report suggests that after a decade, the EPA
“has not developed a clear vision or a comprehen-
sive strategic plan, and has not established values,
goals, expectations, and performance measure-
ments” for integrating environmental justice into
its day-to-day operations (2004, 1). A July 2005
U.S. General Accountability Office report criticized
the EPA for its handling of environmental justice is-
sues when drafting regulations on the implementa-
tion of clean air legislation.
The same month, the EPA responded by propos-
ing that it eliminate race and income as explicit tar-
gets for consideration in its Environmental Justice
Strategic Plan. This remarkable proposal was met 
by a firestorm of criticism, as was the EPA’s sub-
sequent proposal to scale back reporting require-
ments for industrial facilities in the Toxics Release
Inventory program (see Morello-Frosch, Gallegos,
and Pastor 2006). This proposal, if carried out, would
have a particular impact on environmental justice re-
search and activism: the TRI has been a key data set
used in assessing environmental inequality in several
of the studies reviewed above. Indeed, in December
2005, the Associated Press released results from its
study More Blacks Live with Pollution, which was
based on emission information from the TRI reports
that the administration hopes to weaken. Results
showed that blacks are 79 percent more likely than
whites to live in neighborhoods where industrial pol-
lution is suspected of posing the greatest health dan-
ger (Pace 2005).
Reducing the availability of incriminating informa-
tion will do nothing to ameliorate the disparities.
The real challenge lies in the government response—
or lack of response—to these health and environ-
mental issues. And the issues of ongoing disparities
and lack of action seems to have characterized gov-
ernmental efforts at emergency preparedness, re-
sponse, and recovery.
It Is Not Just Hazards: Parks, Transit, 
and Preparedness
The environmental justice framework emerged in re-
sponse to hazards, risks, and disasters. Since its incep-
tion, however, the environmental justice movement
has advocated a broad definition of the environment
as the place “where we live, work, and play”—and
thus considered not only the allocation of costs but
also the distribution of benefits.
For example, environmental justice advocacy has
emphasized the distribution of parks and open space.
Older urban areas, home to disproportionately lower
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income and minority populations, often have less ac-
cess to park resources than do suburbs (Harnick
2000). The inequality is all the more striking given
that the living conditions facing many in the inner
city—multifamily housing in dense conditions—
means that private space is scarce and thus public
parks are all the more critical for public health (de
Vries, Verheij, and Groenewegen 2003). A careful
study of the Los Angeles area found that neighbor-
hoods that were more than 75 percent white enjoyed
thirty-two acres of park per thousand residents,
whereas those that were more than 75 percent Latino
enjoyed less than one acre per thousand residents,
and those that were more than 75 percent black had
about two acres per thousand residents (Wolch,
Wilson, and Fehrenbach 2005, 17).
Environmental justice researchers and activists have
also focused on the costs and benefits of transporta-
tion. Decisions about building new roads, the density
of truck and automotive traffic, and the degree of pol-
lution control for transport activities have significant
consequences for air pollution (Forkenbrock and
Sheeley 2004). But “transportation justice” has taken
on a larger, positive meaning that includes access to
affordable and quality transport that can facilitate a
community’s linkage with jobs, retail shopping, parks,
and other opportunities. This benefit side of the equa-
tion has been important to environmental justice ad-
vocates, and has led to debates and conflicts over the
degree of funding devoted to the mass transit op-
tions frequently used by low-income and minority
residents.20
This issue was critical in New Orleans when
Hurricane Katrina struck. Many people were stranded
in the city even after the call for evacuation. But is-
sues of transit inequality were evident before the
storm: public transit use by blacks was four times
that of whites (19.2 to 5.1 percent), and carpooling,
another indicator of lack of independent transporta-
tion, was twice as high (19.2 to 10.1 percent). Re-
liance on public transit must be taken into account
in disaster planning and evacuation procedures.
Otherwise, the disparity in transportation access will,
as in New Orleans, translate into many who get “left
behind” in a time of crisis.
Environmental and transportation justice, in short,
are at the heart of emergency preparedness and emer-
gency response. The former provides a guidepost to
who is most likely to be vulnerable to the disaster it-
self, and the latter provides information about who
will need the most help when disaster strikes. It is
to the intersection of disaster vulnerability with race,
income, and other social characteristics that we
now turn.
THE SOCIAL ECOLOGY OF DISASTERS
Hurricane Katrina is not the first time in U.S. history
that blacks, the poor, and other marginalized groups
have suffered more in a disaster. It may be, however,
the first time most Americans realized the degree of
inequity in social and economic impacts of disasters.
This inequity, however, is a fact long noted and
studied by disaster scholars—including sociologists,
anthropologists, economists, and geographers—who
recognize that race, ethnicity, resources, income, gen-
der, ability status, and age can shape disaster readiness
and consequences.
The disaster literature often starts with a sharp dis-
tinction between natural and man-made events. The
former include hydro-meteorological disasters (such
as hurricanes, floods, and droughts) and geophysical
disasters (such as earthquakes, volcanic eruptions,
and tsunamis). Traditionally, the latter are industrial
accidents and wars. Rather than a simple dichotomy,
however, disasters often lie on a continuum between
the natural and man-made poles.
This intermediate terrain is the common ground
for many disasters for two reasons. The first is physi-
cal interaction: when a hurricane damages industrial
facilities, for example, leading to oil spills and toxic
chemical releases, the disaster has both natural and
man-made elements. The second reason is the social
fabric through which disaster vulnerability is filtered:
to borrow a phrase from George Orwell, when disas-
ter strikes, some people are more equal than others.
Experts on disasters recognize that unequal risks
are structured by social differences in wealth and
power that arise before, during, and after the actual
cataclysmic events. When the Union Carbide plant in
Bhopal released a cloud of poisonous methyl iso-
cynate gas in 1984, killing 7,000 to 10,000 people
and injuring many thousands more, the victims were
disproportionately poor and low-caste communities
living in squatter settlements near the facility.21
During the accident, plant officials waited two deadly
hours before sounding the siren to alert surrounding
communities to evacuate. After the disaster, com-
pensation to the victims reflected their paucity of
wealth and power: in cases of death, the typical com-
pensation was about $2,500; for injuries, the aver-
age was less than $600.22
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Similar patterns were revealed by Hurricane
Katrina. Ninety-eight percent of the residents of the
Lower Ninth Ward, the lowest-lying area of New
Orleans that was most vulnerable to flooding, were
African Americans (versus 67 percent in the city as a
whole and 37 percent in the entire metropolitan
area).23 As the hurricane drew near, many of the poor
were unable to flee because they lacked private trans-
portation. And, in the aftermath of the storm, a sec-
ond disaster that involves disparities in recovery and
reconstruction processes has started to unfold.
The flip side of excess vulnerability for some is fa-
voritism for others. Before, during, and after natural
disasters, the rich and powerful occupy privileged
positions by virtue of residential location, quality of
construction, means of escape, and preferential ac-
cess to insurance and to postdisaster grants and loans
(Platt 1999). These disparities are not only inequi-
table but also inefficient. For the affluent, the assur-
ance of generous post-disaster government aid creates
a moral hazard: being well-insured against a risk,
they have little incentive to avoid that risk. This en-
courages rebuilding in risky but attractive locations
such as beach fronts.24 At the same time, it diverts
scarce government resources away from disaster-
vulnerability reduction measures that could yield
greater benefits to society.
The point here is that however natural the disas-
ter’s origins may be, much is often unnatural in the
distribution of its costs (and possibly benefits) across
the affected population. And, given that the ongoing
risks of environmental negatives seem to be inequi-
tably distributed by race, income, and privilege, it is
little surprise that one group of disaster studies schol-
ars has found that these dimensions of privilege and
power also impact emergency preparedness, response,
and recovery.
Preparing for the Worst
Research examining issues before a disaster often
finds telling differences in risk perception and attitudes
about a hazard, preparedness activities, and warning
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Source: © Shawn Thew, EPA, Corbis.
Note: A cleanup worker cleans up crude oil spilled from a local refinery in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. The
toxic spill was inundating an estimated 1,500 to 2,000 homes.
communication and response. For example, studies
have found that minorities and the poor are more
concerned about disaster threats, including the risks
of earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, or tornadoes
(Blanchard-Boehm 1997; Flynn, Slovic, and Mertz
1994; Palm and Carroll 1998). Heightened risk per-
ception comes from both previous experiences with
vulnerability and disasters—such as Mexican Amer-
icans who lived through or heard about the 1985
Mexico City earthquake—and from a general lack of
control and power these groups have in their daily
lives. This heightened perception of risk, however,
does not mean these groups are more prepared for a
disaster situation.
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She called her uncle for the last time before the storm
on Sunday morning. Relatives she had entrusted to
take care of him had decided to ride out the storm,
and by the time she discovered this change in plans,
“contra flow” made it impossible to drive back into
the city to get him.
It was nine days before she would hear from him
again. In an anguished voice, he reported feeling the
entire house shake, then feeling initial jubilation when
he realized that the house had sustained minor roof
damage and, of course, the loss of electricity. But with
a gas stove that was working and pre-cooked food in
the freezer, he felt secure. His confidence proved to be
short-lived, when the water rapidly rose in the base-
ment and approached the upstairs in a fast-paced cir-
cular motion. He decided to go to his bedroom where
the bed sat somewhat high off the floor, but before he
could reach his room the water rose above his ankles.
As he got to his bed, the water receded. For the next
several nights with no running water or electricity, he
could hear the furniture downstairs floating and
bumping together against the walls and stairs in the
house. The only other sounds he heard were from he-
licopters overhead and his neighbors with one-story
homes sitting on roofs and trying to summon them.
He would look outside of his window and could see
only water and roof tops. It felt like he was lost in the
middle of the ocean.
Just as the last of his food was running out, he heard
a voice on a bullhorn calling out “is there anyone
here?” He made his way to the front picture window
in the living room and began beating on it to garner
attention. At last, he was seen and picked up by the
National Guard. He was taken by boat to a dry loca-
tion where he was then airlifted by helicopter to the
Louis Armstrong International Airport. At that point
he had no idea where they were taking him. Several
hours later he landed in Lubbock, Texas, at Reese Air
Force Base. It was three days before he was able to
make contact with family members, who immediately
brought him to Marietta, Georgia, where his family
was temporarily taking refuge. The family was re-
lieved: the agony of not knowing, coupled with the
suffering of persons aired on television every day, had
made the waiting even more torturous.
Although what happened to this seventy-eight-year-
old retired New Orleans public school teacher in the
storm was frightening, the aftermath has been of equal
concern. This elderly evacuee lived on a meager retire-
ment package from the New Orleans public school sys-
tem, for which he had worked for more than thirty
years. He lived with his sister, a widow, who owned her
house, which had a downstairs apartment she rented to
her brother for half the cost of utilities and phone bills.
The flood insurance policy was far less than what is
needed to repair the house or to rebuild and he has
been thrust into extreme poverty. The cost of housing
alone is likely to be more than his monthly check. His
health insurance premium has increased from $200 a
month to $600, and he is not eligible for Medicare be-
cause the school system was privately insured. He has
yet to receive anything from FEMA except the first
$2,000 given to most evacuees who applied.
For many elderly, home ownership is the only thing
that stands between them and poverty. Another set of
relatives are age seventy-two and seventy-five. Both
retired and living on fixed incomes, their house was
destroyed by Katrina. They were underinsured for
flooding, and the homeowner’s policy that they had
paid faithfully for the last forty years gave them a
check for only $3,000. They applied for an SBA loan,
which was approved for $170,000. They are both
very confused. How will they ever be able to pay it
back? Borrowing that amount of money this late in
life was simply not an option for them. Yet they have
worked hard all their lives and given much back to
their communities and to their country. What will
America do for them now?
What About the Elderly?
Note: This story was provided by Beverly Wright, director of the Deep South Center for Environmental Justice and a Katrina evac-
uee from New Orleans East.
The lack of power that leads to increased anxiety
about the threat is also associated with an inability
to translate the perception of risk into preventative
action—because that requires resources that are often
unavailable to the poor and minorities, especially
women and children. Research on disaster prepared-
ness behavior—such as devising disaster plans, buy-
ing insurance, gathering emergency supplies, training
response teams, and educating residents about a po-
tential disaster—finds many barriers for marginalized
groups in the United States.
Wealth helps explain a portion of the preparedness
differential: income levels affect the rate of adoption
of some of the more costly mitigation measures, such
as purchasing insurance, strengthening of homes, and
purchasing fire extinguishers (Palm and Carroll 1998;
Vaughan 1995; Fothergill 2004; Bolin and Bolton
1986; Blanchard-Boehm 1997). But it goes beyond
income. After the 1987 Whittier-Narrows earthquake
in California preparedness information was dissemi-
nated only in English despite the language needs of
likely victims (Tierney 1993). Similarly, before Hurri-
cane Hugo in 1989 in Georgia and the Carolinas,
racial and ethnic minority communities were less
likely to have had disaster educational opportunities
to help them prepare for the storm (Faupel, Kelley,
and Petee 1992).
Research has also examined issues of diversity in
how disaster warnings—such as flood sirens or emer-
gency broadcasts—are disseminated and how groups
respond to those warnings of an immediate danger.
Overall, groups of people with lower socioeconomic
status are especially likely not to receive, understand,
or believe disaster warnings (Panel on the Public
Policy Implications of Earthquake Prediction 1975).
Minority households are more likely than white
households to report that relatives were an important
information source with regard to emergencies and to
rely on local television for updates (Morrow 1997;
Perry and Nelson 1991). Research has also found that
Hispanics are more likely than whites, blacks, and
Asians to use social networks for disaster information,
and both blacks and Mexican Americans preferred
neighborhood meetings as a communication channel
regarding hazards more than whites (Blanchard-
Boehm 1997; Perry and Mushkatel 1986; Phillips and
Ephraim 1992). Efforts to ensure that all groups re-
ceive accurate, timely warnings require that disaster
planning organizations plan for different preferences
for warning dissemination—using culturally appropri-
ate materials through television, neighborhood meet-
ings, radio, or informal networks of family and friends.
As we saw in the Hurricane Katrina disaster, con-
textually understanding the evacuation behavior of
residents (especially the most vulnerable) following
disaster warnings is critical. Some research indicates
that race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status have
no effect (Perry and Lindell 1991, Bourque, Russell,
and Goltz 1993), whereas other studies have found
that the poor and minorities are less likely to evacu-
ate or undertake protective action short of evacua-
tion (Perry and Mushkatel 1986; Lindell, Perry, and
Greene 1980; Gladwin and Peacock 1997; Morrow
and Enarson 1996).
This pattern of evacuation delay, even after warn-
ings, may also reflect differences in wealth. Research
suggests that the average level of net worth (a straight-
forward measure of wealth) for blacks is around 
20 percent of the average net worth for whites
(Gittleman and Wolff 2000). However, the weight
of home ownership in that bundle of assets—which
can include businesses, stocks, and other financial
wealth—is much higher for African Americans: home
equity accounts for nearly 63 percent of black wealth
but only about 43 percent for white (Oliver and
Shapiro 1995, 106).25 Home equity is also a dis-
proportionately important component of Latino net
worth. Thus the urge to stay behind and protect one’s
assets, especially if underinsured, may be understand-
able, albeit dangerous.
Nevertheless, evacuation delay is not primarily a
matter of choice. Hurricane Andrew in 1992 pro-
vided an eerie foreshadowing of Katrina’s evacuation
crisis. Before Andrew hit, blacks and those with low
incomes in the evacuation zone were less likely to
evacuate than other groups, most likely due to the
lack of transportation and few affordable refuge op-
tions (Gladwin and Peacock 1997). There were also
reports of public housing residents having to walk or
hitchhike out of evacuation zones (Morrow 1997),
and of poor women unable to leave because they did
not have enough money for supplies or transporta-
tion (Morrow and Enarson 1996).26 Although the
apparent abandonment by public authorities of New
Orleans residents during Hurricane Katrina was per-
haps the most egregious and visible to date, it was not
the first instance of American residents being left with
too few evacuation options as a disaster approached.
When Disaster Strikes
What are the patterns of mortality, morbidity, and
injury when disaster finally strikes? In general, studies
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find that more marginalized groups, often the poor,
women, and minorities, are hit hardest in U.S. disas-
ters, a pattern also seen in disasters worldwide (Wisner
et al. 2004). Katrina is actually part of a long-run
historic record of inequality in disaster vulnerability.
In 1822, for example, hundreds of slaves died in
a hurricane in South Carolina because there was no
high ground and no shelter (Mulcahy 2005). The
1927 Mississippi Flood took the lives of hundreds of
blacks who were rounded up and put on levees with-
out food, water, or shelter. White authorities did not
allow them to evacuate because they feared they
would lose their inexpensive labor force (Barry 1997).
In 1928, a major hurricane hit South Florida and
more than 2,500 people, mostly black migrant work-
ers, drowned in what is considered one of the worst
disasters in U.S. history (Gross 1995; Van Orden
2002; U.S. Weather Service 2006). In Hurricane
Audrey, which hit Louisiana in 1957, the death
rate was thirty-eight per thousand for whites ver-
sus 322 per thousand for blacks (Bates et al. 1963).
Research conducted in the 1970s concluded that
disaster-connected deaths were disproportionately
high among ethnic minorities (Trainer and Hutton
1972), and research on loss from natural hazards in
the United States from 1970 to 1980 further con-
firmed that lower income households experience
higher rates of injuries in disasters such as floods,
earthquakes, and fires than more affluent households
(Rossi et al. 1983).
The pattern of differential impacts is often due to
the quality of housing afforded those lower on the
socioeconomic scale. The low quality construction
of low-cost housing puts residents of such housing
at greater risk (Aptekar 1990; Bolin 1986; Bolin and
Bolton 1986; Greene 1992; Phillips 1993). For ex-
ample, in the United States many ethnic group
members live in older buildings with unreinforced
masonry, which are dangerous in an earthquake
(Bolton, Liebow, and Olson 1993). Mobile homes,
also low-income housing, are the highest risk in a
tornado (Bolin and Bolton 1986; U.S. Department
of Commerce 1995). The poor and minorities also
encounter more problems with homelessness after a
disaster, as was evident in 1989 after the Loma Prieta
earthquake and Hurricane Hugo (Phillips 1998; Fed-
eral Emergency Management Agency 1990). And
even though beachfront property exposes all resi-
dents, regardless of SES, to the risks of hurricanes,
victims with the lowest incomes have the greatest pro-
portionate losses to their housing (Bolin and Bolton
1986; Bolin and Stanford 1991).
A lack of economic, cultural, and social capital in-
creases the vulnerability of poor women in a disas-
ter, including violence from spouses and partners.
The most vulnerable evacuees—minorities, girls
and women, elderly, and the poor—can become
victims of violence, such as beatings, rapes, assault,
forced labor, and forced prostitution (Barry 1997;
Bergin 2006; Fisher 2005; Enarson and Fordham
2001; Fothergill 1999; Morrow 1997; Morrow and
Enarson 1996). There are also issues of violence to-
ward vulnerable, minority groups after a disaster. In
New York after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, a study
of Muslim students found that many of them had
been confronted about the terrorist attacks, includ-
ing young women having their headscarves yanked
off by strangers, and many felt it was not safe to
leave their homes (Peek 2003).
Research also shows that psychological impacts are
experienced in different ways by different groups, de-
pending on factors such as race, ethnicity, gender,
and income. There are, of course, many different
forms of stress stemming from a disaster: the trauma
of the actual disaster itself, the grief and anguish over
injuries and loss of life, and the challenges that
emerge immediately afterward, including the strains
of relocation and temporary life in tent camps or
shelters. Studies show that minorities and lower in-
come groups tend to suffer more psychological im-
pacts along these dimensions than higher-income
and white victims, and may also have less access to
mental health services (Aptekar 1990; Bolin 1993;
Bolin and Bolton 1986; Goltz, Russell, and Bourque
1992; Garrison 1985; Shoaf 1998; Bolin and Klenow
1988; Fothergill 2004; Perilla, Norris, and Lavizzo
2002; Yelvington 1997).
Part of the reason for higher stress is that the poor,
minorities, and single mothers may already feel a lack
of control over their lives, and the dislocation and in-
creased uncertainty about the future add to underly-
ing and persistent stress. Psychological reactions are
also affected profoundly by financial concerns, in-
creased indebtedness, and the challenges of navigat-
ing bureaucracies. Emotional distress has been found
to be greater when victims find that they will not be
compensated for their financial losses. Elderly blacks,
especially, have slower psychosocial recovery than el-
derly whites, partly due to economic constraints
(Bolin and Klenow 1988). This financial stress can be
felt immediately. Many middle- and upper-middle-
class professionals can continue to receive paychecks
during a disaster, whereas those who are paid hourly,
such as service workers, do not.
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The research record does point to important ways
in which the poor and minorities deal with or miti-
gate the psychological impacts of disasters and their
aftermath. In one study in rural Mississippi, black
children who survived a tornado fared better than
white children in a different disaster because the
black children had more support beyond the imme-
diate family and more household and farm respon-
sibilities, which helped stabilize the children and
made them feel more important to the family (Perry
and Perry 1959). Some research has found that fam-
ily was especially important for black victims (Bolin
and Klenow 1988), backing up the notion that fam-
ily ties are important for emotional recovery. This is
one reason why the extended family dispersion after
Hurricane Katrina has been of such concern to dis-
aster scholars and community activists alike.
The poor and minorities may also suffer dispro-
portionately in terms of immediate disaster ser-
vices. In the famous 1928 Florida hurricane, African
Americans were subjected to racial segregation and
inequity in aid services, and were given less time for
bodies to be identified and for the burial of the dead.
They were also forced to recover and handle the
dead through enforced servitude in recovery crews
(Van Orden 2002). In the 1989 Loma Prieta earth-
quake in northern California, the Red Cross declined
an invitation from community-based organizations
to do outreach in low-income and non–English speak-
ing communities (Subervi-Velez et al. 1992). Overall,
the poor are one of the groups most likely to “fall
through the cracks” during emergency relief opera-
tions (Colorado State University 1985).
For example, after Hurricane Hugo hit Georgia
and the Carolinas in 1989, service agencies found that
providing assistance to the rural poor was compli-
cated because of high illiteracy rates, physical isolation
in rural communities, fear and distrust of government
officials, and lack of electronic media for weeks fol-
lowing the storm. Moreover, due to the total lack of
pre-storm interface with the rural poor, they were
“invisible” until the hurricane hit, living in unmarked
homes, on unmapped roads, or hidden behind large
estates (Rubin and Popkin 1990). Indeed, in an eerie
parallel with the lesson Katrina delivered America
about poor people in its midst, emergency response
workers commented that until the hurricane, they
were unaware of the extent of the poverty in their
own neighborhoods (Miller and Simile 1992).
Differences have also been found in post-disaster
sheltering efforts. The tent cities erected after Hurri-
cane Andrew had a population roughly 50 to 60 per-
cent Latino and 30 percent black, well above their
share in the affected zone (Yelvington 1997). In the
United States more generally, those lower on the so-
cioeconomic scale are more likely to use mass shel-
ters (Bolin and Bolton 1986; Bolin and Stanford
1990; Fothergill 2004; Mileti, Sorensen, and O’Brien
1992; Yelvington 1997).
Language is often also an issue during the emer-
gency response phase. Local, state, and federal
emergency response agencies have either too few
or no bilingual personnel for bilingual populations
(Phillips and Ephraim 1992; Subervi-Velez et al.
1992; Yelvington 1997). After the 1987 Whittier
Narrows earthquake, officials put Not Fit for Occu-
pancy signs on buildings with English-speaking ten-
ants, whereas the Spanish translation for buildings
with Spanish-speaking residents read Entry Illegal
(Cooper and Laughy 1994, 7). After the 1989 Loma
Prieta quake, some house warning tags, placed on
homes to warn residents of the building’s status,
were printed in English only (Phillips and Ephraim
1992). Complaints were also numerous in the Katrina
response about inadequate language capacities to
deal with affected Latino residents, a rapidly grow-
ing population in the South (Muñiz 2006).
Existing inequities are often played out in the
interactions between relief workers and victims. For
example, after the 1979 Hurricane Frederick in
Alabama, black communities received less food, ice,
shelter, and assistance than white communities, and
white neighborhoods had their power restored first
(Beady and Bolin 1986). After the Loma Prieta
earthquake, shelters in well-off neighborhoods had
more volunteers than homeless clients and received
visits from the mayor, whereas a low-income emer-
gency shelter reported that the mayor did not visit
and that white volunteers had made racist remarks
(Dhesi 1991).
Media coverage also plays a role in which commu-
nities are favored or disfavored in the process of
response and subsequent recovery, partly because dis-
aster officials themselves sometimes rely on media
coverage for setting priorities. In the Loma Prieta
earthquake, the English-language news focused on
the damage in San Francisco and, to a lesser degree,
on Santa Cruz (which was nearly 80 percent white
when the quake struck), often skipping over the ef-
fects in the devastated town of Watsonville (which was
nearly 65 percent Latino). Some analysts argue that
the increased media attention contributed to the more
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rapid recovery in the wealthier and whiter communi-
ties and continued stagnation in Watsonville (Subervi-
Velez et al. 1992; Rodrigue and Rovai 1995).
Did the media do a better job in covering the dis-
parate effects of the Katrina crisis? Reporters got on
the scene quickly, often before government officials;
indeed, one striking moment of the crisis occurred
on the evening of September 1, three days after
Katrina struck, when FEMA head Michael Brown
indicated that he had just learned about evacuees at
the New Orleans convention center and was asked
by ABC Nightline anchor Ted Koppel: “Don’t you
guys watch television?” Media also kept significant
attention on those who had been displaced and were
at risk—and probably helped expedite the assistance
that eventually arrived.
At the same time the mass media seemed to 
exaggerate incidents of looting and violence in ways
that cast many of Katrina’s victims as victimizers.
Although lawlessness was afoot in post-Katrina New
Orleans, the reporting—erroneous in part because
of the chaos and incomplete information—seemed
to only confirm the worst suspicions about the
urban poor. Still, to the media’s credit, many re-
porters were horrified by the lack of governmental
response, labeled it an affront to basic American val-
ues of decency and community, and highlighted
important issues of race, class, and poverty in their
longer-term analysis of the crisis.
The overall record suggests that the media were
right to pick up on this race and class dimension of
the Katrina story. The pattern of difference and ne-
glect that was so dramatic in the immediate after-
math of Hurricane Katrina was not an exception to
the historical rule, but the most recent in a long line
of inequitable disaster impacts.
Relief and Recovery
The inequities before and during a disaster are often
played out further in the period after a disaster. Many
minorities and the poor have had greater difficulties
recovering from disasters due to less insurance, lower
incomes, fewer savings, more unemployment, less
access to communication channels and information,
and the intensification of existing poverty (Bolin and
Bolton 1986; Bolin and Stanford 1998; Cooper and
Laughy 1994; Hewitt 1997; Peacock et al. 1997;
Tierney 1988). After Hurricane Andrew, for exam-
ple, blacks and non–Cuban Hispanics were more
likely than whites to receive inadequate settlement
amounts, and black neighborhoods were less likely
to have insurance with major companies, a fact that
may have been connected to redlining (Peacock and
Girard 1997).27
Studies have also addressed racial, class, and ethnic
differences in who receives disaster recovery assis-
tance. Bolin and Bolton (1986) concluded that the
blacks, who had lower income than whites in their
study, needed multiple aid sources to deal with large
losses because they did not receive enough support
from fewer sources. Blacks were also less likely than
whites to receive Small Business Administration (SBA)
loans, more likely to use interfaith disaster services,
and tended to recover economically more slowly.
Following the 1997 Grand Forks flood in North
Dakota, flood relief was geared away from migrant
workers, hurting primarily Hispanic single mothers
(Enarson and Fordham 2001).
Upper middle-class victims in several disasters have
been more likely to receive assistance than minorities
and the poor because they knew how to navigate the
relief system, fill out the forms, and work within the
government bureaucracy (Aptekar 1990; Fothergill
2004; Rovai 1994). In addition, poorer victims had
more trouble making trips to the disaster assistance
centers following Hurricane Andrew because of trans-
portation, child care, and work difficulties (Dash et al.
1997). Furthermore, the traditional nuclear family
model used by some relief programs left poor, minor-
ity women at a disadvantage (Morrow and Enarson
1996).
Housing continues to be a significant issue for
low-income and minority disaster victims in the re-
covery period. Past research has found that housing
assistance favors middle-class victims, particularly
homeowners. Of course, helping homeowners is im-
portant and may be especially critical for middle-
class black and Latino families. Such families have
much lower homeownership rates but, as noted ear-
lier, tend to have more of their net worth tied up in
home equity than their white counterparts do. Still,
including renters prominently in the relief mix is part
of a more racially equitable approach.
Renters are affected in several ways. Higher-
income evacuees often secure the surplus housing
available in a community, leaving none for lower-
income victims (Quarantelli 1994). In many disasters,
rebuilding services are geared toward homeowners
and legal tenants, and not toward multifamily and
affordable housing units which are occupied by 
low-income tenants. Some landlords also take active
advantage of the situation. The Whittier-Narrows
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earthquake, for example, occurred on the first of the
month, the day rent was due. Many landlords evicted
low-income renters for late rent and some even lied
about building conditions to get rid of their low-
income tenants (Bolton, Liebow, and Olson 1993).
There are alternatives. In the aftermath of the
Loma Prieta earthquake of 1989, political pressure
was put on FEMA to provide more housing for low-
income victims. In mid-November 1989, FEMA
agreed to provide more than 140 mobile homes in
Watsonville and Pajaro, two areas with a lack of af-
fordable housing. FEMA had initially resisted offer-
ing mobile homes, with one FEMA spokesperson
referring to them as “instant slums” (Bolin and
Stanford 1993, B46). But a formal petition brought
against FEMA for violating regulations and statutes
for low-income earthquake victims forced the change
(U.S. House of Representatives 1990). And a bold
plan put together by the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development after the 1994
Northridge quake (see profile that follows) managed
to help many low-income renters quickly get back
on their feet.
Legal residency is another critical issue in disaster
recovery. Following disasters, many undocumented
immigrants, unsure about the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) policy, avoid recovery
assistance for fear of deportation (Subervi-Velez 
et al. 1992; Bolin 1993; Cooper and Laughy 1994;
Yelvington 1997). Muñiz (2006) offers anecdotal
evidence that this was an issue in Katrina as well. She
also shows how the occasional assumption that Latino
residents were undocumented rather than legal res-
idents sometimes led FEMA to fail to offer appropri-
ate information about housing assistance to eligible
individuals.28
In addition, the nontraditional family structures
of immigrant households can be a challenge for dis-
aster officials. Following Hurricane Andrew, FEMA
was not prepared for some of south Florida’s family
structures, particularly Haitian families, who often
had several families in one household—FEMA’s
temporary assistance was set up for nuclear families
with one head of household (Morrow 1997).
Culture can also influence resident attempts to ac-
cess service. Many Latinos have experienced or had
been told, through personal networks, of earth-
quakes in their countries of origin, such as the 1985
Mexico City earthquake and its deadly aftershocks;
they thus feared the temporary shelters set up after
quakes (Bolton, Liebow, and Olson 1993; Phillips
1993). In Miami, immigrants from countries with a
history of political repression, such as El Salvador
and Guatemala, avoided official assistance (Enarson
and Morrow 1997). In California, some residents of
Central American origin refused to use the National
Guard camps, because the tents and fences re-
minded them of death camps in their native countries
(Phillips 1993).
Indeed, the presence of disadvantaged persons,
already living in marginal housing, presents disaster
service providers with demands that are often un-
anticipated within the provisions of routine shelter
and housing programs (Bolin and Stanford 1990).
In the context of the limited resources that might be
available after a disaster, this issue is a simple reflec-
tion of the ongoing crises of poverty, inequality and
discrimination in American society—and disasters
often provide a window on a world of hurt being ig-
nored on a daily basis by the media, policy makers,
and the general public.
Reconstruction and Long-Term Effects
The long-term reconstruction after a disaster can
simply continue the pattern of inequity and stress
that has played out throughout the disaster itself. As
with the stage of short-term recovery, the search for
safe, affordable housing after a disaster is one of the
most critical, and unsolved issues for lower income
families and minorities in the United States. In vir-
tually all of America’s major urban areas, there is
already an acute housing crisis for lower income
households before a disaster hits—and the disaster
exacerbates existing problems.
Numerous studies have found that problems of
homelessness and low-income housing shortages be-
come even more serious in the years after a disaster
(Bolin and Stanford 1990, 1991; Comerio, Landis,
and Rofe 1994; Greene 1992; Phillips 1993, 1998;
Wright 1989). For example, a year after the Loma
Prieta earthquake, 90 percent of the affected multi-
family units were still out of service; four years later,
50 percent of the affected multifamily units remained
unlivable (Comerio, Landis, and Rofe 1994). Several
other studies have found that poor women have the
most difficult time rebuilding homes, finding new
places to live, and getting out of substandard tempo-
rary housing (Enarson and Fordham 2001; Morrow
and Enarson 1996).
Members of racial and ethnic minorities and the
poor are also less likely to qualify for and receive var-
ious types of aid for reconstruction, including SBA
In the Wake of the Storm 25
loans, and to have trouble with the housing process.
For instance, after a Texas tornado, whites were much
more likely to qualify for and receive such loans than
blacks (Bolin 1986; Bolin and Bolton 1986), and
after the Northridge earthquake, ethnic minority
households had limited access to FEMA loans and
SBA grants (Bolin and Stanford 1998). In the Loma
Prieta reconstruction, victims were ineligible for dis-
aster aid if they had had illegal housing before the
disaster. After the 1995 flooding in New Orleans,
even though low-income elderly women were over-
represented in the population applying to FEMA
for low-interest loans, they were three times less
likely than other elderly households to receive them
(Childers 1999).
A few studies show that some of the poorest vic-
tims may temporarily do better after a disaster. This
was the sentiment expressed by some, including
former First Lady Barbara Bush, who after visiting
Katrina evacuees in the Houston Astrodome, said:
“so many of the people in the arena here, you know,
were underprivileged anyway, so this is working very
well for them.”29 But most of the empirical evidence
shows that most victims—especially minority and
low-income victims—are worse off in the years that
follow the disaster. For example, residents of very
low-income housing, such as single room occupan-
cies (SROs), do not easily qualify for assistance pro-
grams. Many disasters have pushed the marginally
homeless population into the category of perma-
nently homeless.30 In general, disasters may also push
many lower income and working class families into
debt and financial insecurity, dashing hopes to buy
houses, attend college, and so forth.
The Loma Prieta quake in California also shows
that physical recovery can vary in different areas. This
likely differentiation in long-term recovery is a source
of great controversy now in New Orleans, with some
plans suggesting that the black areas of the city will
be the last to be brought back in a sort of phased re-
covery. Yet, as in contemporary New Orleans, the re-
search suggests that many disaster victims often do
not want to relocate, and remain in, or try to return
to, badly damaged communities. Post-earthquake
studies found that many Hispanics were connected
to their neighborhoods and did not want to move
away (Bolin 1993). After Hurricane Andrew, blacks
were less likely than whites to relocate, and data
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The telephone began ringing very early in the morn-
ing of November 19, 2005, for a former New Orleans
resident who had, like most of her family and friends,
lost her home and possessions to Katrina. They were
all told that it was the storm surge that had destroyed
the levees that flooded their homes and 80 percent of
the city. But two and a half months after hurricane
winds had buffeted the city, it was a policy surge that
seemed about to complete what Katrina had begun.
The phone was ringing because today was the day
that the Bring New Orleans Back Commission would
unveil a report it had commissioned from the Urban
Land Institute, a nonprofit organization that includes
real estate professionals, academics, and others with
expertise in land issues. The word on the street was
that the plans did not look good for eastern New
Orleans. New Orleans East, like the Lower Ninth
Ward, lies below the industrial canal and is also pre-
dominantly African American. The similarities, though
significant, completely dissipate for education and in-
come. Where the Lower Ninth Ward has been por-
trayed as black and poor, New Orleans East has
hardly been portrayed at all.
New Orleans East was a community where most of
the city’s black professionals, school teachers and ad-
ministrators, famous musicians (from hip-hop to jazz),
businessmen, and politicians lived. It was an area pri-
marily of homeowners with flood insurance. It repre-
sented nearly 40 percent of the city’s tax base, but the
Urban Land Institute plan included a map showing
most of New Orleans East being relegated to parks
and green space or subject to a building moratorium
until neighborhoods proved viability.
In the aftermath of Katrina, New Orleans East evac-
uees and their friends have learned that all of their ed-
ucation and money did not shield them from natural
disasters, the neglect of the levee system and coastal
wetlands erosion, and the ways in which public policy
decisions reinforce the legacy of race. Their commu-
nity was literally wiped off the map with no regard for
the social, economic, and financial impact this decision
would have on those affected. Worried residents are
still waiting to see what will emerge with regard to
levee protection, SBA loans, insurance settlements,
and land buyouts. Will race, once again, be a factor
that colors the decision-making process?
Where Is New Orleans East? Race and Invisibility
Note: This story was provided by Beverly Wright, director of the Deep South Center for Environmental Justice and a Katrina evac-
uee from New Orleans East.
show that blacks remained in damaged areas (Girard
and Peacock 1997). Reasons for this persistent of at-
tachment include economic barriers, residential seg-
regation, and a sense of place. Often overlooked in
the reconstruction effort are the ways in which com-
munities find meaning in where they live and where
their families have lived for generations, and why the
right of return has such special salience.
Indeed, the reconstruction of neighborhoods has
an importance that goes beyond simply respecting
sentiment. Although African Americans and Latinos
have often been steered through housing practices
to segregated areas, such areas can also constitute
ethnic enclaves where minority entrepreneurs can
find clienteles and build up local-serving businesses.
One emerging worry in New Orleans is exactly what
will happen to the black middle class if the commu-
nities they have served are dispersed across the United
States and their neighborhoods are not rebuilt for
return. The social capital of a community and the fi-
nancial capital of its entrepreneurs are often inter-
twined. Rebuilding must take this into account before
designating certain areas as unfit for reconstruction.
Learning from History?
The historical record suggests a pattern of differen-
tial impacts: groups that lack access to resources,
power, and information often find themselves fur-
ther disenfranchised before, during, and after a dis-
aster. Despite some efforts at reform, the question
that results is straightforward: with so much evi-
dence, why was so little done to address disparities
before Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast?
In our view, one reason may be that unlike the en-
vironmental justice field, the disaster field has not
been immersed in the difficult but fruitful interplay of
rigorous scholarship with an emerging social move-
ment. Disaster scholars have tried to affect policy—
indeed, the field has been criticized for being too
applied—but unlike the work of the EJ scholars, it
has generally not informed, and been informed by,
activists (Fothergill, Maestas, and Darlington 1999).
This is partly due to the nature of disasters—one sees
episodic organizing against particular abuses by, say,
FEMA rather than the sort of sustained efforts
around changing EPA policy typical of the EJ field.
But this is a gap that should be addressed. Real pol-
icy change is usually driven by social pressures and
not simply the good science and good research we
associate with academic scholarship.
Communities sometimes become politicized in
their reactions to the social disruption and inequities
that arise in the wake of a disaster—and disasters can
open broader political dialogues on social inequali-
ties (Bolin and Stanford 1991) or create an enhanced
sense of ethnic identity (Davis 1986). After the mis-
treatment of blacks during the 1927 Mississippi
Flood, blacks shifted from the Republican to the
Democratic Party, and many left the South for 
the northern states (Barry 1997). After Hurricane
Andrew, Mexican farm workers, Haitian immigrants,
and African American church women organized
and mobilized their neighborhoods (Enarson and
Morrow 1997) and several African Americans were
elected to public office (Peacock et al. 1997). After
the Loma Prieta earthquake, coalitions of commu-
nity activists, federal agencies, and private organiza-
tions pushed to build low-income housing as part of
the planned reconstruction in Santa Cruz County—
and these efforts not only helped to improve the liv-
ing conditions of Latinos, but also helped fuel a
broader movement to increase Latino political voice
in the Monterey Bay region (Bolin 1993).
Katrina certainly seems to have put a spotlight on
the chasms of race, poverty, and environmental injus-
tice in the United States. Whether the window stays
open for policy change with regard to disaster readi-
ness, response, and recovery remains to be seen. In
our view, part of keeping that window open 
involves understanding the continuum between
chronic and acute risk, and building increased ties
between environmental justice researchers and dis-
aster studies scholars, and between environmental
justice activists and those working in the affected
communities of the Gulf Coast.
Until Hurricane Katrina, there was a gap between
the work of environmental justice and the sociology
of disasters, even though both areas are concerned
with inequality and environmental hazards and risks.
Environmental sociology books, for example, rarely
discuss disaster research, and disaster studies rarely
draw on environmental justice literature. Yet the
goals and principles of the environmental justice
field are the same as those of the disaster field: to use
systematic and thorough research to uncover in-
equality in exposure to hazards and risks, and to sup-
port organizing and policy change to reduce risk and
suffering. New research bridges are being formed.
Bolin (2006) argues, for example, that environmen-
tal justice’s historical equity studies might be a par-
ticularly useful tool for disaster sociologists to use to
understand pre-disaster vulnerabilities and post-
disaster processes.
In general, a move toward more vulnerability
analyses and more use of the EJ framework could help
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disaster research be more historically and geographi-
cally informed. It could help the field—and policy-
makers—move away from viewing disasters as acute
events, concentrated in time and space, and separate
from routine, or nondisaster, social processes. Per-
haps the disaster field could also use some of the con-
cepts and themes of the EJ movement, such as taking
a broad view of the environment, including housing,
air quality, transportation, and the like, using a rights-
based approach to environment, applying the idea
that everyone has a right to the environmental qual-
ity and protection from risks, and advocating for 
democratization in decision making about the envi-
ronment and disaster readiness.
Homeland Security and Unequal Risks
Since the tragic events of September 11, 2001, na-
tional officials have been preoccupied with the impor-
tant task of fighting terrorism and preventing terrorist
incidents. However, for homeland security pro-
grams—and related emergency preparedness pro-
grams for that matter—to be effective, they must have
the cooperation and trust of all Americans (Working
Group on “Governance Dilemmas” in Bioterrorism
Response, 2004).
Yet the history of racial disparity affects popular
views of the effectiveness and fairness of a govern-
ment response to an emergency: for example, a 2004
RAND Corporation study in Los Angeles County
found that 77 percent of white respondents perceived
that the public health system would respond fairly in
a bioterrorist event (Eisenman et al. 2004), while 
63 percent of African Americans, 68 percent of
Asian–Pacific Islanders, and 73 percent of Latinos
felt that the public health system would respond
fairly in a terrorist crisis. The study concluded: “To
strengthen bioterrorism preparedness, public health
officials must continue to improve perceived fairness
among African Americans and Asian/Pacific Islander
communities.”31
The emergency response in the aftermath of
Katrina has done little to build trust in government.
This is particularly so in the Louisiana petrochemi-
cal corridor so heavily populated by poor residents
and blacks. Although to date no such attack has
been made on a U.S. chemical facility, more than
3,000 accidents involving more than 10,000 pounds
of hazardous materials have occurred since 1987,
with smaller incidents occurring daily (Hinds 2001).
It is little wonder that the Justice Department has
determined that threat of a terrorist targeting such
plants is “both real and credible” and could be
more serious than attacks on nuclear power plants,
which at least undergo regular security assessments by
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Gremaldi and
Gugliotta 2002, A1).
The magnitude of a terrorist attack on U.S. chem-
ical facilities could easily exceed the loss of life suf-
fered on September 11, 2001. The surgeon general
of the U.S. Army identified chemical plants as sec-
ond only to bioterrorism in terrorist threats to the
United States, and a 2002 Brookings Institution re-
port ranked chemical facilities third in the number
of fatalities that could occur from a terrorist attack
(O’Hanlon et al. 2002). Of the nation’s 15,000
chemical facilities, the U.S. Government Account-
ability Office reports that 123 are close enough to
potentially endanger more than 1 million people if a
terrorist attack occurred (2004).
Railroad cars carrying chemicals are also of con-
cern. Millions of Americans are at risk from toxic
“time bombs” that travel on railroad cars through
populated areas. In October 2004, government safety
officials warned that more than half of the nation’s
60,000 pressurized rail tank cars did not meet indus-
try standards, and they raised questions about the
safety of the rest of the fleet as well. In January 2005,
two Norfolk Southern Railway Company trains
crashed into each other, releasing deadly chlorine gas
in Graniteville, South Carolina, killing nine people,
injuring 240, and forcing the evacuation of nearly
5,500 residents (Daily 2005). Some residents in the
all-black New Hope Graniteville community com-
plained that the Aiken County government emer-
gency responders left the black community behind
for nearly thirteen hours as they evacuated whites
(Brundrett 2005; Bogdanich and Drew 2005).
Post-Katrina events have done little to stir new
confidence among those fenceline communities that
have been subject to pollution releases from nearby
chemical facilities, or living near the potentially dan-
gerous transit corridors discussed. In January 2006,
for example, a storage tank at the Exxon Mobil Re-
finery in Baytown, Texas, spilled a 150,000-barrel
storage tank that contained benzene, a known car-
cinogen. Although Exxon Mobil officials insisted the
release was not harmful, a day after the incident and
hours after residents bombarded the company with
complaints, Exxon Mobil sent a team of thirty work-
ers wearing jumpsuits and plastic gloves. The follow-
ing day, the company distributed a letter, signed by
the manager describing and apologizing for the in-
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cident, to the residents and the Baytown Housing
Authority.
The current Texas law calls for reporting such spills
within twenty-four hours to the Texas Commission
on Environmental Quality (TCEQ); Exxon Mobil
took twelve hours to report, and waited a full day and
a half before informing TCEQ officials that the inci-
dent went off the plant’s grounds and affected the
nearby community. Harris County’s Pollution
Control and Environmental Health Division officials
learned of the off-site release from media accounts on
Wednesday, more than two days after the incident.
Local residents, state, and county environmental of-
ficials have questioned the delayed notification—but
the penalties for late reporting and creating a nui-
sance are set between $2,500 and $10,000, at a level
that is hardly a deterrent for Exxon Mobil, the largest
energy company in the world, and seems to grossly
undervalue the lives of fenceline communities.
Although such communities may be especially vul-
nerable, releases of toxic chemicals can kill and injure
people relatively far from the accident scenes. Pro-
tecting those with the least resources is critical to
protecting all of us. Addressing the issues of dispar-
ity that seem to plague both chronic risk, as indicated
by the statistical studies cited, and the acute risks of
accidents due to terrorism, accidents, and other fac-
tors would surely build the sort of widespread trust
that will be needed in a real national emergency.
KATRINA, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE,
AND NEW POLICY
Long before Katrina struck, residents and activists
had struggled against the disparate social, economic,
and health impacts of the rapid proliferation of
chemical facilities and sprawling industrial and resi-
dential development on poor African American res-
idents in the Gulf Coast (Bullard 1990a; Roberts
and Toffolon-Weiss 2001; Allen 2003; Lerner 2005;
Urbina and Wald 2005). The evolution of this cor-
ridor, which included massive buyouts by large cor-
porations of large swaths of small towns to build large
petrochemical complexes (Markowitz and Rosner
2002), has been driven by the availability of oil,
natural gas, and sulfur but has also resulted from
two other important factors. One is a state govern-
ment that proactively pursued the jobs and tax rev-
enue promised by the petrochemical industry. The
other is a legacy of racism that has left poor African
American residents hostage to hazardous working
conditions, reduced labor rights, and worsened envi-
ronmental quality.
Although Hurricane Katrina has laid bare for the
entire nation the consequences of this discrimina-
tory system and its social, political, and ecological di-
mensions, it also raises opportunities for civil rights,
environmental, labor, and environmental justice or-
ganizations to advocate for a process of relief, recov-
ery, and rebuilding that can begin to dismantle
systemic socioeconomic and environmental inequal-
ities that have plagued the region. Environmental
justice organizing will be central to ensuring that the
diverse voices of African American and poor com-
munities are central to the long recovery and re-
building process that lies ahead.
Preventing a “Second Disaster” After Katrina
The amount of debris left behind by Katrina—an
estimated 22 million tons—is staggering (Griggs
2005, 12A). More than half, 12 million tons, is in
Orleans Parish. In addition to wood debris, EPA
and LDEQ officials estimate that from 140,000 to
160,000 homes in Louisiana may need to be demol-
ished and disposed (EPA and Louisiana Department
of Environmental Quality 2005). These homes in-
clude over one million pieces of “white goods”—such
as refrigerators, stoves, and freezers—that require dis-
posal. An additional 350,000 automobiles must be
drained of oil and gasoline and then recycled; 60,000
boats must be staged and maybe destroyed; and
300,000 underground fuel tanks and 42,000 tons of
hazardous waste must be collected and properly dis-
posed (Varney and Moller 2005).
Currently, officials are debating about how to dis-
pose of the debris. The EPA’s Science Advisory Board
(SAB) expressed deep concerns over the LDEQ de-
bris management plan that calls for burning hurri-
cane debris in open pits, using so-called “air-curtain
incinerators” (EPA Science Advisory Board 2005,
Inside EPA). The SAB recommended that the EPA
consider actions other than open burning, such as
temporary landfilling at parish collection points, sig-
nificant processing, recycling and reuse at collection
points, and long term land filling, outside the area 
if needed. The Solid Waste Association of North
America (SWANA), in its September 21, 2005, re-
port, Hurricane Katrina Disaster Debris Man-
agement: Lessons Learned from State and Local
Governments, also noted that the use of open pit in-
cineration in Florida after Hurricane Andrew in 1992
generated many complaints from the public, and
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county commissioners responded by shutting down
all debris open pit burning operations whether they
used the air curtain process or not.
The disposal process, whether through burning
or landfills, can have serious equity dimensions.
After the 1994 Northridge earthquake, for exam-
ple, the removal of concrete rubble from collapsed
freeways stirred controversy when one entrepreneur
in Huntington Park, a city that was over 90 percent
Latino and far from the epicenter of the quake,
sought to store and recycle the concrete. Already
host to numerous hazards, including elevated levels
of air toxics due to heavy industrial uses and truck
traffic, the community found itself living next to a
pile of concrete that was sixty feet high and soon
nicknamed La Montaña (the mountain). With con-
crete dust draping cars and houses, and asthma at-
tacks on the rise, community members organized,
and pressured the city council to take action.
The city council eventually declared the site a
public nuisance and, in 1998, the business owner
was ordered by a judge to remove the rubble. The
owner declared bankruptcy, leaving the future of La
Montaña in doubt; three years later, another judge
ordered the owner of the land on which the business
sat to clear up the debris. But those orders were also
ignored. It was not till 2004 that the California
Integrated Waste Management Board took respon-
sibility and authorized a clean-up. In the words of
Linda Moulton-Patterson, board chairwoman, “if
there has ever been a poster child for environmental
justice, this is it” (Renaud 2004, B3). And if this is
any harbinger of how timely and equitable debris re-
moval will be, there are reasons to be worried about
the aftermath of Katrina.
In the Gulf Coast, there are other critical environ-
mental and public health threats beyond the issue of
the cleanup and disposal. Katrina toppled offshore oil
platforms and refineries, causing six major oil spills
releasing 7.4 million gallons of oil (Cone and Powers
2005). It also hit sixty underground storage tanks,
five Superfund sites, and numerous hazardous well
facilities. In addition, more than a thousand drinking-
water systems were disabled—E. coli in the flood-
waters far exceeded the EPA’s safe levels (Cone
2005, A18).
New Orleans area residents also face complex
health threats from contaminated soil and sediments
left by Katrina floodwaters (CDC–EPA 2005). This
includes threats from contaminated drinking water
supplies, polluted floodwaters, broken sewage treat-
ment systems, oil and chemical exposures, toxic sed-
iments and sludge. EPA tests in some New Orleans
neighborhoods found elevated lead and arsenic con-
centrations (CNN 2005). Tests from independent
sampling conducted by the Louisiana Environmental
Action Network (LEAN) in several New Orleans
neighborhoods showed high levels of polynuclear
aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), many of which are
known or suspected carcinogens (Dunn 2005).
How, when, and at what level of standards con-
taminated neighborhoods get cleaned up is a major
environmental justice concern. More than 110,000
of New Orleans 180,000 houses were flooded, and
half sat for days or weeks in more than six feet of
water (Nossiter 2005). As many as 30,000 to 50,000
homes citywide may have to be demolished, and
many others can be saved only with extensive re-
pairs (Loftis 2005). Instead of emphasizing uniform
cleanup standards, equal protection, and environ-
mental justice for low-income and minority commu-
nities, some public officials have sent mixed signals for
rebuilding low-lying black neighborhoods such as
the Lower Ninth Ward (Sontag 2005). This issue
has heightened the anxiety among residents who
want to return home and caused division within the
Bring Back New Orleans Commission created by 
the mayor (Rivlin 2005).
Talk of not rebuilding black New Orleans neigh-
borhoods after a hurricane is not new. In 1965,
Hurricane Betsy hit the mostly black and poor New
Orleans Lower Ninth Ward especially hard, and ac-
celerated the decline of the neighborhood and the
out-migration of many of its longtime residents
(Dyson 2006, 11). Given this history, many resi-
dents today do not trust the government to protect
their interests and prioritize their neighborhoods for
clean up and reconstruction (Remnick 2005). They
are worried about some sort of “second disaster.”
Promoting an Eco-Social Approach to Recovery
In our view, understanding and proactively address-
ing the socioeconomic, political, and public health
impacts of Hurricane Katrina requires an eco-social
approach that merges the focused reconstruction
process with broad attention to issues of economic
and environmental justice. The joining of social and
environmental concerns is critical. Although there has
been substantial research documenting the ecological
problems plaguing coastal communities in the Gulf
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region on one hand, and a large body of work assess-
ing the socioeconomic and public health problems on
the other, there have been few attempts to purpose-
fully integrate these two fields in a way that makes
explicit the connections between public health, the
environment, and social inequality in the region (for
notable exceptions, see Bullard 1990a; Colten 2005).
An eco-social approach would ensure that regula-
tory activities, as well as disaster management, recov-
ery, and planning initiatives effectively integrate the
goals of social equity and economic justice with com-
prehensive environmental sustainability objectives.
Over the last decade, environmental justice advocacy
has transcended reactive strategies that emphasize
hazardous facility siting and has moved toward proac-
tive approaches aimed at transforming the underlying
structural causes of environmental inequality, eco-
nomic inequities, and health disparities. In the realm
of environmental health, EJ activists have also pushed
scientists and regulatory authorities to move beyond
facility-by-facility or chemical-by-chemical risk assess-
ment and regulation toward more holistic strategies
that address a multitude of pollutant exposures and
incorporate concepts of social inequality, economic
disparities, and residential segregation into assess-
ments of community susceptibility to environmental
hazards (Morello-Frosch et al. 2001).
Such cumulative impact assessments are critical.
They would better account for the real exposures
borne by diverse populations generally exposed to a
variety of pollutants where they live, work, and play—
such as the air they breathe and the food and water
they consume. Although data gaps pose challenges
for estimating the cumulative health risks associ-
ated with multiple pollutants and emission sources,
some researchers and regulatory agencies have begun
thinking about how to integrate existing information
to address community concerns (National Environ-
mental Justice Advisory Council 2004). In a place like
Louisiana, where environmental insult seems to have
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Source: © Ted Soqui, Corbis.
Note: Paul Guerra standing inside his brother’s flooded home. He is trying to save their valuables and other doc-
uments. Most were destroyed by the murky flood waters and toxic black molds. The house is in the Lake View
area of New Orleans.
been piled on economic and social injury, a cumula-
tive impacts approach certainly seems warranted.
Nevertheless, scientists and policymakers are still
catching up to community wisdom on this issue. For
example, Alternatives for Community and Environ-
ment (ACE) has taken a holistic approach to address-
ing spiraling asthma rates in the Roxbury-Dorchester
areas of Boston. This entails advocacy across several
fronts including housing quality, transportation jus-
tice, disparities in municipal investment in neighbor-
hood infrastructure, access to preventive health care,
pollution sources and sanitation, and health educa-
tion (Agyeman 2005; Morello-Frosch et al. 2006).
This form of broad-based advocacy is influenced by
a hard lesson from environmental justice activism.
Even though local, hazard-by-hazard organizing is
a powerful strategy, it drains community resources
and locks organizing efforts into a reactive rather
than a proactive mode (Agyeman 2005).
In the context of promoting socially equitable dis-
aster planning and recovery in the wake of Hurricane
Katrina, such a holistic strategy implies consideration
of two major issues: the confluence of social vulnera-
bility and cumulative impact. As the government re-
sponse to Hurricane Katrina so tragically revealed,
attention to social vulnerability is not systematically in-
tegrated into disaster planning and management. This
is partly because vulnerability is deeply rooted in the
legacy of racial and class-based discrimination, which
requires systemic political and economic changes to
overturn. But the challenges of change do not obviate
the realities: the combination of socioeconomic stres-
sors faced by disenfranchised communities coupled
with the elevated environmental hazard exposures
documented above has been described as a form of
double jeopardy (Institute of Medicine 1999).
In New Orleans, this double jeopardy was revealed
by a legacy of race and class discrimination that had
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For many American families, a home is both a part of
a dream of belonging and the family’s greatest source
of wealth. Consider a Katrina evacuee, happy to sur-
vive the hurricane and now contemplating the finan-
cial storm ahead.
She owns her home, the last payment having been
made in August, the same month Katrina hit the city.
Before Katrina, a similar house in her block sold for
$219,000. The only proposal that our evacuee has
seen for compensating her if she is not allowed to re-
build is in a bill proposed by a Louisiana congressman,
Richard Baker. The bill proposes funds such that
property owners be given 60 percent of the equity in
their homes less any money they receive from the in-
surance company. Based on this proposal, our evacuee
would receive $131,000, 60 percent of the assumed
$219,000 equity. Her insurance policies, however,
paid $28,000 more—$159,000. Thus she would re-
ceive nothing from the government and it would be
able to take over her land and prevent her from re-
building. Her net loss from the federal bail-out is
$60,000, not to speak of the loss of control.
The story gets worse. After the death of her mother
in April 2005, our evacuee, along with one sister, in-
herited the family house. She remembers her father
saying with pride, “his house is for you, children.
Always remember, it’s easier to get ahead if you don’t
start from scratch. This is your scratch.” Her parents
worked to purchase their home—in fact, they acquired
two houses and three lots in Mississippi. Yet the home
that her parents struggled so hard to acquire for future
or generational wealth is scheduled for demolition.
Her parents had more than adequate homeowner’s in-
surance, but had only $39,000 in flood insurance, a
sum woefully inadequate to replace the family home.
Like most elderly persons or couples in the New Orleans
area whose homes were paid off, the flood insurance
policy had not been revisited since Hurricane Betsy—
forty years ago. The homeowner policy adjusters are
fighting clients to ensure that they receive as little as
possible from a policy that has been in effect for nearly
fifty years.
It is easy to count the actual dollar loss for the fam-
ily. But the social capital that spans nearly a hundred
years, based on the vision and foresight of the parents
and grandparents of our evacuee, cannot be measured.
What this will mean for the wealth, health, and secu-
rity of this family and the many families just like them
is the untold story. Is this the way to treat those who
bought into the American dream, worked hard all of
their lives, raised and educated their children, and
placed God and country at the center of their lives?
Counting Our Blessings, Counting Our Losses
Note: This story was provided by Beverly Wright, director of the Deep South Center for Environmental Justice and a Katrina evacuee
from New Orleans East.
literally corralled and trapped African Americans and
the poor into ecologically and economically vulner-
able spaces from which many were unable to escape.
Indeed, although residents were urged to evacuate
the city before, in one post-Katrina study, 55 percent
of the respondents who did not evacuate said that
one of the main reasons they did not was that they
did not have a car or other way to leave (Washington
Post, Kaiser Family Foundation, Harvard School of
Public Health Project 2005). This left people stranded
in a rapidly flooding city, often on rooftops and in
deplorable, life-threatening conditions in makeshift
shelters with little food, water, or basic services. In
the same survey, 68 percent of the respondents felt
that the federal government would have responded
more quickly to rescue people trapped by floodwaters
if more of them had been wealthier and white rather
than poorer and black.
But even as Katrina graphically revealed deep struc-
tural divisions across racial and class lines, the storm
also washed away the illusion that the wealthy can
fully insulate themselves from the invisible health risks
and long-term consequences of environmental in-
equalities and social injustice. As sociologists Drake
and Cayton noted more than fifty years ago: “The
color line is not static; it bends and buckles and some-
times breaks” (1945, 101). And when the levees
shielding the poorest and blackest community in New
Orleans broke, the water left nearly 80 percent of the
city in a toxic soup. All New Orleans neighborhoods
must now contend with the reality of a new riskscape
that has spilled across traditional racial, class, socio-
economic, and political lines. Indeed, after conduct-
ing preliminary soil and air sampling and analyzing
state and federal regulatory data, some environmen-
tal groups have concluded that without extensive
cleanup and remediation of toxic sediment, nearly 
75 percent of the city will be unfit for families with
children (Barringer 2005).
Better Safe Than Sorry?
Community participation is critical to develop long-
term regional development initiatives that are eco-
nomically viable and protect public health. This
necessitates moving regulation, land use planning,
economic development, and environmental policy
“upstream” to promote “just sustainability”—that
is, an emphasis social justice and economic equity as
well as the need to live within ecosystem limits and
preserve resources for future generations (Agyeman
2005, 79). One path toward achieving this goal is to
integrate the precautionary principle more systemat-
ically into environmental policy making, regulation,
and future infrastructure investments in the Gulf re-
gion.
The meaning of the precautionary principle has
been interpreted broadly by many stakeholders, which
has made the framework controversial (Sustein 2003;
Dorman 2005). Yet, the essence of the precautionary
principle promotes planning, alternatives assessment,
and anticipatory action, with the aim of minimizing
environmental health and ecological calamities. The
precautionary principle also seeks to mobilize envi-
ronmental and public health policymaking that
otherwise can be paralyzed when implementation
depends too much on technocratic or scientific
certainty.
In the case of environmental health, the principle
would require that regulators be more proactive if sci-
entific evidence strongly suggests, but does not yet
fully prove, that a facility, chemical exposure, or pro-
duction process may be jeopardizing public health,
particularly among communities already disparately
impacted by toxics. It acknowledges that in the never-
ending quest for better data and unequivocal proof of
cause and effect, environmental regulators can lose
sight of a basic public health principle—namely, the
importance of exposure reduction and disease pre-
vention (Morello-Frosch, Pastor, and Sadd 2002).
Equally important, the precautionary principle
shifts the burden of hazard assessment, monitoring,
and data generation activities onto those who pro-
pose to undertake potentially harmful activities or
chemical production (Kriebel and Tickner 2001;
Kriebel et al. 2001). For example, a precautionary
approach requires that the health and safety effects
of new chemicals be fully examined before they are
approved for widespread commercial use and re-
leased into the environment. This contrasts with our
current model of environmental regulation, which
presumes that chemicals and production processes
are safe unless definitive data and research prove
otherwise. This reactive approach to regulating in-
dustrial production inevitably creates economic and
social costs (such as decreased property values and
increased incidence of environmentally mediated dis-
eases, such as cancer and childhood asthma), and does
not avoid the effects of cumulative exposures locally
to multiple emissions sources through various expo-
sure pathways.32
Opponents often argue that the precautionary
principle can result in overregulation that decreases
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economic efficiency and threatens jobs. Yet the pre-
cautionary principle is not really that radical. In the
United States, for example, precautionary regulatory
approaches are evident in current regulatory practices
for marketing new drugs and pharmaceutical prod-
ucts: extensive testing and clinical trials are required
to assess the effectiveness and safety of new products
before they can be marketed to consumers and health
providers. Moreover, the precautionary principle ap-
pears in several international environmental accords
and treaties and enjoys widespread public support
in other economically thriving industrialized coun-
tries in Europe, including codification in an innova-
tive regulatory program just passed by the European
Union Parliament (Raffensperger and Tickner 1999;
Calver 2000; Sustein 2003; Dorman 2005).33
Several states have taken the lead on both environ-
mental justice and the precautionary principle (SERC
2003). In California, for example, the synthesis
between the two is evident in the state’s recently
adopted environmental justice guidelines (California
Environmental Protection Agency 2004). California
has already taken major steps toward integrating pre-
caution into its regulatory process by phasing out the
use of a category of polybrominated diphenyl ethers,
a widely used fire retardant chemical, that has prob-
lematic, albeit poorly understood, human health
effects, and which has been shown to be accumulat-
ing at an rapid rate in the breast milk of San Francisco
Bay area women.
States are also developing precautionary strategies
to improve disaster planning and to protect vulner-
able communities and workers from environmental
health calamities. New Jersey recently became the
first state to require developing and implementing
chemical plant security measures to protect facilities
from either a natural disaster or a terrorist attack.
Such proactive regulatory strategies could be a model
for other states, such as Louisiana, that are vulnera-
ble to regular natural disasters and that have major
industrial facilities adjacent to densely populated
fenceline communities or in low-lying areas prone to
flooding.
Of course, new regulatory regimes and policy ini-
tiatives, particularly when they are locally or state-
based, can lead to “hazard-shifting” from one group
to another. Such risk reallocation, for example,
from residential communities to workers occurred
in Chicago when the city, due to a moratorium on
building new landfills and strict rules on incineration,
sought new ways to recycle and dispose of municipal
waste. As a result, the city’s corporate contractor,
Waste Management Incorporated, was allowed to
institute a recycling system that required workers to
sort and separate waste, which exponentially in-
creased the workplace hazards and injuries that the
predominantly African American workforce in the
recycling industry faces (Pellow 2000, 2002).
In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, we are witness-
ing risk shifting phenomena in the attempt to quickly
dispose of hazardous debris from neighborhoods
across New Orleans and consequent lax enforcement
of safety standards for workers engaged in demoli-
tion, hauling, and reopening hazardous landfill sites
(Russell 2005). Moreover, EPA has suspended air
pollution regulations, ostensibly to ramp up refinery
production and address the national shortfall in
energy supply due to storm damage of large produc-
tion facilities in the Gulf region.
The precautionary principle seeks to bridge com-
munity health and worker safety concerns to promote
opportunities for introducing and promoting less
toxic alternatives in production. The hope, after all, is
not to simply reallocate environmental hazard bur-
dens from one population to another, but rather to
promote an integrated regulatory approach in which
industry, government, and society are compelled to
adopt viable strategies for pollution prevention and
toxics use reduction that benefit everyone.
One highly effective approach involves using 
information-based (or “right-to-know”) strategies 
at the state and federal levels. For example, the
Massachusetts’ Toxics Use Reduction Act (TURA)
of 1989 requires that firms develop both an inven-
tory of chemicals flowing in and out of each produc-
tion process at a facility, and a toxics use reduction
plan. Although firms are not required to implement
these plans, the process itself helps the organizations
identify more efficient production methods that pre-
vent pollution and decrease production costs. TURA
has resulted in significant toxics use reduction. After
adjusting for production increases, 2003 data indi-
cates that reporting firms decreased their toxic chem-
ical use by 40 percent from the 1990 base year and
generated 70 percent less waste per unit of product
(TURI 2005).
At a national level, the Toxics Release Inventory,
which was created by Congress in 1986 in the wake
of the Bhopal disaster, requires large firms that emit
a threshold volume of chemicals to report annually
to EPA their own estimates of pollutant releases into
the air, ground, and waterways. Despite some of its
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limitations in terms of regulatory oversight and the
number of chemicals covered, the TRI is still one of
the more successful regulatory tools promulgated by
EPA in over a decade. OMB Watch recently reported
that since 1988, disposals or releases of the original
299 reportable chemicals have dropped by close to
60 percent (OMB Watch 2005).
Indeed, the database and its accessibility to the
public are the keys to its success. With annual report-
ing, TRI data has been leveraged to educate and
mobilize the public about those facilities with per-
sistently high emissions of some of the most toxic
pollutants. Industry has used the database to assess
and improve its own performance as evidenced by
some impressive emissions reductions over the years.
The Bush administration has sought to reduce re-
porting requirements by both lowering the thresh-
old of use that triggers a report and by having the
reports required every other year rather than the cur-
rent annual timetable. The rationale has to do with
reducing cost but the proposal also works against
the community-level and market-driven empower-
ment that the administration purports to support.
Social Infrastructure and Community Voice
Community empowerment is central to the precepts
of environmental justice, and many EJ advocates
have particularly emphasized including the voice of
those who may be traditionally shut out of the reg-
ulatory and policy-making process due to challenges
such as language or citizenship barriers. Although
this emphasis is driven by a sense of justice, govern-
ment also functions most effectively when it works
in partnership with community groups that can pro-
vide local knowledge, mobilize resources, recruit
volunteers, and highlight urgent issues that easily fall
below the technocratic and regulatory radar screen.
Agencies charged with overseeing the recovery
and rebuilding of New Orleans claim to have devel-
oped systems to ensure that decision making includes
some form of community participation (such as
access to information, public meetings, and hear-
ings). Historically, however, these processes tend to
be procedural and do not necessarily ensure equitable
outcomes in regulatory, zoning, land use planning,
economic development, and facility siting decisions.
Moreover, if state and federal agencies are to truly
enhance effective public participation in the recovery
process, they need to consider basic tenets of EJ
organizing.
First, an overemphasis on technocratic and scientific
expertise for decision making can lead to a process that
inappropriately frames fundamentally political and
moral questions (that is, “transcientific” issues) in
scientific terms (Weinberg 1972). This ultimately
excludes the public from important policy debates
and diminishes its capacity to participate in the pro-
duction of scientific knowledge itself. Second, diverse
communities have important insights and localized
knowledge about ways in which environmental haz-
ards may be affecting their health and well-being
(Morello-Frosch et al. 2006). Third, although eco-
nomic, technocratic, and scientific analysis will be
critical to informed decision making about how,
where, and whether to rebuild, this expertise should
not be the sole driver of how agencies set priorities,
allocate resources, and address community health
concerns.
Keeping these precepts in mind is part of system-
atically ensuring that communities are central to
shaping disaster planning, recovery, and rebuilding
efforts. After all, the future resilience of New Orleans
will depend just as much on repairing social infra-
structure as on repairing physical infrastructure.
Ensuring effective community participation in post-
Katrina decision making will thus necessitate exten-
sive preparatory work, including building capacity,
and providing economic and social support. This will
enable residents to return, find jobs, restart busi-
nesses, and repair the social fabric of their neighbor-
hoods, including schools, places of worship, health
care facilities, and other institutions.
In understanding the contours of community par-
ticipation, history matters. Katrina was evenhanded in
its winds but the disparate impact on blacks and the
poor has its roots in previous inequities in the infra-
structure related to storm protection and the systemic
racial segregation of neighborhoods into high ground
versus low-lying areas. This form of discrimination,
coupled with disparities in public investments in
drainage and pumping systems, consistently worked
to the advantage of white, wealthier communities
(Colten 2005). History both structured the disaster
and affects community attitudes and suspicions about
the rebuilding process.
The Bring New Orleans Back Commission, formed
by city government, recently released a planning re-
port to address the reconstruction process. One of
its most controversial provisions is a proposed four-
month moratorium on new building permits in areas
heavily flooded by Katrina (2006). The plan and
other current discussions suggest that certain com-
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munities will never be resettled, and the potential
equity implications for future recovery efforts are
problematic. A recent analysis, for example, indi-
cates that if the rebuilt New Orleans were limited to
the population previously living in zones relatively
undamaged by Katrina it would be a city of fewer
than 120,000 people—losing about 60 percent of its
white but more than 80 percent of its black popula-
tion (Logan 2006).
Community organizations are concerned. They
and the residents they represent should be welcomed
as valuable partners and be empowered to play a
central role in rebuilding and ensuring the future
sustainability of their neighborhoods. Capacity-
building is critical and significant independent sup-
port is needed to allow organizations to pursue goals
that may run counter to government and business
interests. Such support would give communities the
assistance and training necessary for them to under-
stand and critique complex environmental impact
statements, scientific data, and other technical doc-
uments and thus be able to engage effectively in pol-
icy advocacy.
Given the wide dispersion of New Orleans resi-
dents, civic engagement poses unique and significant
challenges. Outreach efforts will require innovative
communications and technology infrastructure that
in turn provides returning and displaced residents
with the means to receive and share information re-
lated to community rebuilding, support services,
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Source: © David Bacon.
Note: A community protest at Romic Environmental Technologies, a firm that processes toxic waste in
California’s Silicon Valley. The company’s main operation is located in East Palo Alto, a city with an overwhelm-
ingly minority population—59 percent Latino, 23 percent black, and 9 percent Asican Pacific Islander. Residents
concerned about company expansion plans joined labor advocates in protest after a Filipino immigrant worker
named Rodrigo Cruz was asked to clean a railroad car containing toxic sludge after another worker refused be-
cause his breathing equipment indicated dangerous concentrations of carbon monoxide. Cruz complied, but his
breathing apparatus had a defective line, and he wound up suffering permanent brain damage.
job opportunities, and housing. Moreover, legisla-
tion that ensures a living wage and provides afford-
able housing, quality schools, and opportunities to
recoup economic losses and restart affected small
businesses will be central to giving middle- and lower-
income residents a real opportunity to return and col-
lectively rebuild their communities in New Orleans.
Rebuilding the Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama
Gulf Coast region will test the nation’s ability and
commitment to address lingering social inequality
and institutional barriers that created and maintained
current racial divides. In the rebuilding process for
the Gulf, certain principles are, we think, key for both
environmental and economic justice:
• Enforce existing environmental and health standards.
Cleanup standards should not be weakened or com-
promised in low-income and minority neighbor-
hoods. Allowing waivers of environmental standards
could compound the harms already caused by Katrina
and undermine health protection of the most vulner-
able members of our society.
• Ensure equal funding, equal cleanup standards, and
equal protection of public health and environmental
response in minority and low-income communities.
EPA, FEMA, and the Army Corps of Engineers need
to enforce Executive Order 12898 regarding envi-
ronmental justice in the cleanup and rebuilding in
the hurricane-affected Gulf Coast region. They should
report to Congress on their compliance with this
provision monthly for the next twenty-four months
to ensure that minority and low-income communi-
ties do not receive disparate treatment.
• Conduct independent environmental testing and
monitoring. Because of the loss of trust in govern-
ment, independent testing and monitoring of the
water, soil, sediment, and air in the affected areas is
needed using the best testing technology and methods
available. This testing must provide an assessment of
current contamination levels, as well as continuous
monitoring.
• Build healthy, clean, and safe schools for children. It is
imperative that schools and the land on which they
sit are safe, clean, and free from health-threatening
contamination. Existing schools and school grounds
should be tested and remediated to the most protec-
tive existing cleanup guidelines set by the EPA.
Repairs and rehabilitation of schools should use new
green standards for school construction, with an em-
phasis on healthy indoor air, nontoxic materials for
construction, maximum design for energy efficiency,
and natural light for improved learning.
• Update emergency transportation and mass evacuation
plans. Funding for local transportation providers is
needed to furnish ongoing emergency transportation
preparedness for all public transportation personnel,
as well as specific training on public transportation
provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act. An
emergency transportation fund is also needed to sup-
port hurricane evacuees in their return home and to
support transportation needs in cities where evacuees
are currently living.
• Balance green building and social justice. Rebuilding
efforts in the Gulf Coast region should adopt smart
growth and green building principles to ensure that
past environmental inequities are repaired along with
the physical infrastructure. However, greenness and
justice need to go together. Green building in New
Orleans and the Gulf Coast could involve exorbitant
fees for architects, materials, and construction—and
greening that fails to address issues of affordability,
access, and equity may open the floodgates for per-
manent displacement of low income and minority
home owners and business owners.
• Recognize the right to self-determination and voice.
Katrina survivors have a right to self-determination,
and displaced persons should be allowed to return to
their homes and neighborhoods to exercise their de-
mocratic rights guaranteed under our constitution.
Hurricane evacuees, who are scattered across the
United States, should continue to have full voting
rights in their home states and be allowed to partic-
ipate in decision making that affects their lives and
their communities. Such a democratic impulse is at
the heart of the environmental justice paradigm.
• Stress equitable development. In the real world, costs
and benefits associated with development are not
randomly distributed. Equitable development strat-
egies should be implemented that safeguard the
interests of long-term residents in communities
undergoing change.34 Given the history of race rela-
tions in New Orleans and the Louisiana, Mississippi,
and Alabama Gulf Coast region, equitable develop-
ment models could address many longstanding in-
equities and actually offer a new start on the region’s
promise and, perhaps, the promise of America.
Finally, we would suggest that the principles of
economic and environmental fairness that drive our
rebuilding prescriptions also be incorporated into the
funding decisions needed to finance the reconstruction
of the Gulf Coast. If this was a national emergency—
and the media and public concern signaled that it
was—then we need a national response and federal
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funding. Such funding should not be generated, as
the Bush administration has proposed, by cutting
spending on other populations suffering from eco-
nomic deprivation and environmental duress. At the
very least, we should remember the physician’s adage:
“First, do no harm.” Cutting food stamps and health
care for one group of poor people to fund relief for
another group of poor people does not fit well with
that admonition.
Disasters Beyond Katrina
Although Katrina rightly cast attention on the short-
falls in existing environmental and emergency poli-
cies, positive policy inroads have been made in recent
years. Some disaster agencies, for example, have made
a concerted effort to incorporate better policies for a
diverse population. First, groups have worked to dis-
seminate information in more languages to better
serve non–English-speaking populations. Since the
early 1990s, both warnings before and recovery
information after disasters have been released in as
many languages as practical in most situations in an
effort to reach increasingly diverse populations. For
example, the Association of Bay Area Governments
(ABAG) and the United States Geological Survey
(USGS), after a Bay-area earthquake, produced a
large newspaper insert about the risk in a dozen lan-
guages (Mileti and Darlington 1997). FEMA has also
worked to publish material in several languages and
has produced materials in Spanish on their website.
Change has often been driven by community pres-
sure and innovation. Richmond, California, for
example, is home to a large Laotian community con-
sisting primarily of low income refugees who entered
the United States after the 1970s. Richmond has
more than 350 petrochemical industrial facilities, in-
cluding the Chevron-Texaco oil refinery, the largest
refinery in the western United States. Regulatory
agencies in the county had set up an early warning
system to inform community members of toxic emis-
sions from industrial accidents, but this system had
a significant shortcoming: Despite the multilingual
needs of the Richmond community, the warning sys-
tem functioned only in English. Organizing by Asian
Pacific Environmental Network’s Laotian Organizing
Project (LOP) led to a multilingual warning system
for toxic releases.
In general, the past decade has seen an increased
sensitivity by many disaster response agencies. Fol-
lowing criticism in the Loma Prieta earthquake, the
American Red Cross, America’s leading nongovern-
mental disaster relief group, has become more aware
of, and committed to, diversity. Still, progress is slow.
A recent Red Cross Survey found that only 5 percent
of its volunteers are black, 2 percent Latino, and 
2 percent Asian—and its board of governors is over-
whelmingly white (Muñiz 2006, 10–11). The Cal-
ifornia Governor’s Office of Emergency Services
(OES) also attempted to educate, prepare, and assist
those in this highly diverse state. The California
Department of Social Services also contracted with a
consulting firm headed by a former FEMA official to
lead workshops for their disaster workers and school
administrators on issues of race, ethnicity, religion,
culture, and issues around decision making in disas-
ters. One of the focuses of these workshops is to get
officials to think issues of language, and to use tradi-
tional and nontraditional approaches to communi-
cating disaster risk to diverse populations.
Some institutional innovations have also been note-
worthy. After Hurricane Hugo, for example, FEMA
hired a civil rights organization to work with affected
communities that had low levels of trust in govern-
ment. Perhaps most remarkable was the successful
housing plan that the U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) put together fol-
lowing the 1994 Northridge earthquake. HUD de-
cided to provide special Section 8 housing vouchers
to help the poorest victims of the quake find housing
anywhere in California and quickly begin their recov-
ery. It sold the plan to Congress and received millions
in funds within a few days after the quake, and then
got the state, landlords, and the region’s leaders to
work together to quickly distribute vouchers. This al-
lowed many low-income renters, often forgotten in
the rush to redress homeowner needs, to make their
own choices about their next home, and expedited
the process of getting some stability back in their lives
(Katz and Muro 2005). This bold, unprecedented
government plan was unfortunately not repeated
after Hurricane Katrina in 2005.
Support from the National Science Foundation,
which funds many disaster research projects, and
from FEMA, which runs its Higher Education Proj-
ect, to study and teach issues of differential vul-
nerability has also increased. The National Science
Foundation has provided funding for many projects
in an effort to understand issues of inequity and re-
duce vulnerability. In some cases, these efforts are
participatory action projects that bring researchers
and racial minorities and poor communities together
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to work on hazard issues. These are exactly the sort
of interactions that we think will move the field.
FEMA’s efforts also include a recently developed
course on differential vulnerability called “A Social
Vulnerability Approach to Disasters,” which is posted
on its website for teachers to use in their college
classrooms. In the course students learn about the
feminization of poverty, political marginalization,
and how racism results in hazards vulnerability.
Because this is a new project, it remains to be seen
how widely it will be used and whether the informa-
tion will reach those who need it—one wishes that
FEMA officials themselves had taken the course be-
fore Katrina devastated the Gulf Coast.
There is also evidence that local governments and
communities can use a disaster situation to improve
housing conditions or other aspects of the commu-
nity. For example, after Hurricane Andrew some
local projects were initiated to improve poor neigh-
borhoods, and some replaced or restored public
housing units were better than those there before the
storm. After the Loma Prieta earthquake, the city of
Watsonville established a variety of redevelopment
projects and adopted an ordinance requiring that
25 percent of housing built after the disaster be af-
fordable for farm workers and low-income families.
Still, much needs to change in the arena of disaster
policy. First, attention should be given to the inter-
actions of relief workers and victims of different
classes, races, and ethnicities. There is some indication
that emergency personnel who arrive in a disaster set-
ting to offer assistance may be culturally insensitive.
Cultural awareness and sensitivity—to religious, lin-
guistic, class, ethnic, and racial differences—are im-
perative for disaster agencies and relief organizations.
National agencies such as FEMA and the Red Cross
and other groups that respond to disaster on a large
scale need to continue to be educated on the diver-
sity of various communities and plan accordingly.
Housing, as noted earlier, is a significant issue in
understanding the vulnerability of the poor and mi-
norities in disasters. Research has shown that older,
low-cost housing that is brought up to safety stan-
dards often becomes unaffordable, thus creating a
situation whereby low-income families cannot find
housing that is both safe from natural disasters and
affordable. Such circumstances are partly due to the
fact that the private housing market hinders the re-
construction of low- and moderate-income rental
unit rebuilding—with this in turn due partly to red-
lining by insurance companies, partly to exclusionary
zoning, and partly to the usual challenges of rising
housing prices in an unregulated market. Policies
should be initiated that address these issues, includ-
ing pressure on insurance companies, strategies for
inclusionary housing, and flexible rent controls in
overheated markets.35
Another policy thrust should encourage commu-
nity participation in both preparing for and recov-
ering from disasters. Individuals, households, and
communities may be vulnerable in many ways to var-
ious risks, but also have capacities and strengths.
Large-scale organizations and agencies working on
disasters need to understand the specific diversity is-
sues of each area, plan for changing demographics of
the area, and ensure that members of all communi-
ties are involved in the process. These institutions
should also continue efforts to disseminate disaster
information in the needed languages for communi-
ties and move the voices of the most disenfranchised
and vulnerable to the forefront by bringing women’s,
civil rights, interfaith, and environmental justice
organizations to the disaster planning table.
Marginalized groups need to be a part of the re-
building process from the beginning, especially if
they have been historically excluded and marginal-
ized in community affairs. Emergency management
should identify and locate high-risk sectors on com-
munity vulnerability maps, integrate this information
into GIS systems, and then involve those community
members in planning and response (Morrow 1999).
More inclusive participation could also be furthered
by recruiting more members of the lower and work-
ing classes and minorities for disaster professions and
in the research community.
The media also need to coordinate with emer-
gency managers, public officials, and disaster relief
workers to better understand disaster events. This
coordination will likely lead to more accurate report-
ing and to inclusion of all affected groups, not just
the affluent. Future research on the issues of inequal-
ity in disasters should also be developed in conjunc-
tion with practitioners working in communities and
follow up with practitioners to see how research find-
ings are, or are not, being implemented in the field.
Finally, much discussion after Hurricane Katrina
has revolved around what went wrong and who was
to blame.36 We and many other Americans are pleased
at the recent congressional report in February 2006
that focused on problems in the government’s im-
mediate response to the Katrina disaster. This re-
port, however, did not meet the nonpartisan “gold
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standard” of the 9/11 Commission—whose rec-
ommendations as a result were widely accepted—
nor did it make sufficient use of outside researchers
on long-term issues of disaster preparedness and
recovery.
We advocate an independent, objective, scientific
commission to investigate the governmental re-
sponse to Hurricane Katrina and to recommend fu-
ture policy and practice. In our view, a commission
should include experienced researchers and practi-
tioners who represent a wide range of views and back-
grounds, and should have a broad charge. Katrina
was a catastrophic event in its own right but it is also
an example of the environmental vulnerabilities that
affect many communities on an everyday basis. From
the brownfields of Detroit to the refineries of Los
Angeles, from the nuclear waste dumps on Indian
Land to the pesticides threatening the health of
Latino farm workers, the country boasts a sad history
of inequality in exposures and government indiffer-
ence. Understanding this broader pattern and sug-
gesting how both ongoing environmental policy and
disaster readiness could minimize differential risks
would be a major contribution to the public debate.
CONCLUSION: JUSTICE AND THE COMMONS
Certain moments in human history somehow clarify
all that has gone wrong and all that needs to change.
In Selma, Alabama, in 1965, state and local police
attacked civil rights demonstrators with tear gas and
clubs, only to fuel a nonviolent resistance that led to
the all-important Voting Rights Act. In South Africa
in the early 1960s, Nelson Mandela was arrested and
jailed, but his solid and dignified resistance from his
prison cell helped bring about a dramatic political
transition and an end to racial apartheid. In East
Germany in the 1980s, activists and common citi-
zens, who felt the sting of restrictions on their travel
and other freedoms, demonstrated against a repres-
sive government, toppling both their Communist
Party leaders and the Berlin Wall.
Was Katrina such a historical moment? Surely the
crisis and its disparities have cast American issues of
both poverty and inequality in stark colors. Although
some conservative critics have sought to dispel any
“lessons from Katrina,” the sort of environmental
disparities brought to light by the storm defy an
American value system that insists that everyone has
the right to a decent environment. The differential
effects of Katrina were neither natural nor accidental.
In the Gulf Coast, the crisis built on an existing pat-
tern wherein minorities and the poor lived in more
precarious low lands and the ongoing risk from the
infamous Cancer Alley was already distributed in
ways symptomatic of environmental injustice. The
problem is not limited to the South and its legacy of
Jim Crow. Research suggests that environmental
disparities by race are rampant in much of the United
States, that rational land use choices and market
mechanisms do not explain the pattern of difference,
and that there are often important consequences for
the health of diverse communities.
Research and experience also suggest that there
are important racial and class differences in the ex-
perience before, during, and after many cataclysmic
events. These disparities include differential readi-
ness, gaps in the attention of relief and emergency
agencies, and sharp inequalities in the process of re-
building and reconstruction. In a sense, this is no
surprise—the existing distribution of chronic risk
sets the parameters for disaster and recovery—but it
is disturbing nonetheless for a society that generally
believes that both disaster and relief should be equal
opportunity affairs.
Worries about the inequality of power, wealth,
and environmental risk may seem the province of
justice, but evidence is growing that the distribution
of environmental health and safety can affect the
level of environmental quality for society as a whole.
When inequalities of wealth and power are great,
after all, those at the top of the scale have (or think
they have) greater opportunities to avoid reliance on
public goods. Why worry about toxic pollution if
you can live far from the scene of the crime? Why
worry about public transportation if you have your
own car? Why worry about disaster vulnerability if
you can count on generous subsidies from the gov-
ernment to recoup your losses?
Yet emerging statistical evidence now suggests that
wide disparities in environmental conditions may
jeopardize overall environmental quality. In a cross-
sectional analysis of the fifty U.S. states, James Boyce
et al. (1999) find that those with a more unequal dis-
tribution of power—as measured by data on voter
participation, educational attainment, Medicaid ac-
cess, and tax fairness—tend to have weaker environ-
mental policies, greater environmental stress, and
worse public health outcomes. A recent Morello-
Frosch and Jesdale analysis (2006) indicates a persis-
tent relationship between increasing levels of racial-
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ethnic segregation and increased overall magnitude
of environmental degradation, such as air pollution,
and health risks, such as individual estimated lifetime
cancer risk (see also Lopez 2002).
Parallels may exist in the acute moments of disas-
ter. When acute events are more likely to affect the
least powerful, it is possible that the social guards will
be let down. One wonders how well the levees would
have been maintained had it been thought that
whiter and wealthier neighborhoods would have suf-
fered as much as they eventually did. One is curious
whether chemical plant security would be an even
higher priority were the distribution of the fenceline
population not so predominantly minority and poor.
Yet by allowing the weak link in the social chain—
the poorest communities in the low-lying areas of the
city—to be exposed, all of New Orleans was put at
risk. By failing to value fenceline lives and communi-
ties, the risks rise for neighborhoods far from the first
releases from a chemical incident. When the political
economy of environmental protection allows hazards
to be placed in someone else’s backyard, they often
will, and there may well be more of them.
Establishing environmental justice as a serious pol-
icy concern is therefore not simply the right thing to
do—it may be the best thing for protecting the
“commons.” We mean this in more ways than sim-
ple disaster prevention or hazard mitigation. The en-
vironmental justice framework elevates important
concerns about fairness and voice in the decision-
making process. It suggests that everyone has the
right to a decent environment and that such a basic
human right should not simply be usurped by the
vagaries of the market or the privileges of power. It
returns us, in short, to basic American values of
equity, democracy, and opportunity.
Will we learn from Hurricane Katrina? To do so,
we need to remember the shock and concern so many
felt in the days of the emergency and apply this to
both new preparations for disaster and new strate-
gies for environmental protection. More research is
needed but so is political and civic leadership. Katrina
has opened a window on a dark side of America—the
economic and environmental vulnerability of poor
and minority communities. We can close that window
or we can use the new view to chart a better, health-
ier, and more equitable future for all Americans.
NOTES
1. A Knight-Ridder analysis focusing on deaths from
Katrina suggested that there were very few differences by
race or income (see Simerman et al. 2005). However, a
reanalysis of the data shows that such a simple compari-
son was misleading. The most likely to die were the el-
derly who were often stranded in nursing homes and
hospitals. But whites were much more likely to be
among the old—the median age for whites in New
Orleans in 2000 was 41.6 years while it was 29.4 for
blacks. Once one accounts for the age distribution of
whites and blacks in the affected areas, there was dispar-
ity by race for both those younger and older than 65
(Sharkey 2006). Moreover, death is only one, albeit the
most extreme, form of victimhood: loss of property and
community, and the suffering and grief that came with
being stranded in the city, seems to have distributed
quite unequally by race and income (see Logan 2006).
2. Economists have long known how to incorporate such
distributional weights into cost-benefit analysis (see, for
example, Little and Mirrlees 1974, 234–42; Ray 1984,
22–31; for further discussion, Boyce 2000).
3. Extending this approach to intergenerational allocation
implies that future lives and health should not be heav-
ily discounted (as is done when a discount rate is used in
conventional cost-benefit analysis), but rather valued on
a par with present lives and health.
4. The purchasing-power advantages of high-wealth indi-
viduals and communities are compounded when they
wield disproportionate political power; conversely, the
disadvantages of low-wealth people are compounded
when they belong to politically disenfranchised racial
and ethnic groups (Boyce 1994).
5. Taken from the executive summary, http://www.epa.
gov/history/topics/justice/01.htm.
6. Some environmental justice activists argued that the
Anderton et al. studies were biased, at least in their pre-
sentation of the results, because they were funded by a
grant from the largest waste management firm in the
United States. However, the techniques Anderton and
his colleagues used did represent methodological ad-
vances at the time, though there have since been method-
ological criticisms, discussed later.
7. For discussion, see Anderton, Anderson, Rossi et al.
1994; Been 1993, 1995.
8. Other power-related variables have been explored in the
literature, including home ownership (which is also an in-
dicator of wealth but also highly associated with commu-
nity engagement and political influence), voting turnout,
and recency of immigration.
9. Note, however, that the move-in explanation is essen-
tially based on income, not race. Although little explored
in the literature, a racial move-in pattern could be the re-
sult of housing discrimination, an explanation that would
shift the locus of attention to that arena but would not
obviate either the role of power or the legacy of racism.
10. See Noriko Ishiyama (2003) for a discussion of the role
of tribal sovereignty, particularly the right of a tribe to
choose to host facilities that might be unwelcomed else-
where in exchange for payment.
11. There was also a subsequent argument that the signifi-
cance of previous multivariate results may have been
overstated because of inappropriate controls for spatial
relationships (see Bowen et al. 1995; Bowen 2001).
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12. John Oakes (1997) specifically shows charts in which per-
cent minority and various income variables rise sharply as
tracts within one mile of a TSDF tract are considered. In
a polytonomous logistic regression, he uses a two mile
standard and finds that all the socioeconomic variables
indicate disparity and are significant at the .01 level.
These findings are also subtly suggested by the tests for
area aggregation using a 2.5 mile buffer in Anderton,
Anderson, Rossi, et al. (1994, 238–39) but are used only
to dismiss previous zip code analyses.
13. Another issue is the challenge of correctly locating haz-
ardous sites that are incorrectly listed. For efforts to cor-
rect location information, see Vicki Been (1995) and
Boer et al. (1997); Sadd et al. (1999) discuss GIS tech-
niques to improve reliability in existing large databases.
14. Earlier reviews of the literature include Paul Mohai and
Bunyan Bryant (1992), Andrew Szasz and Michael
Meuser (1997), and William Bowen (2001).
15. The challenges are several. First, because census tracts
change shape over time, demographic information of
previous years should be “reshaped” to fit new tract
polygons. Second, information on facilities is sometimes
incomplete for decades prior to the emergence of strict
environmental standards. Third, because siting and
move-in can occur simultaneously, sophisticated statisti-
cal techniques are required.
16. A longitudinal study by Yandle and Burton (1996)
claimed to find no evidence of disproportionate siting,
but methodological critiques of this work were quite
sharp by authors associated with both sides of the envi-
ronmental justice debate (Anderton 1996; Mohai 1996).
17. As indicated in an earlier note, another methodological
issue involves spatial autocorrelation (Bowen 2001). This
refers to the tendency of variables to be influenced by
their neighbors—or in common parlance, the tendency
of land uses, ethnic groups, and income classes to cluster
together such that, for example, a neighborhood’s in-
come level is influenced by its proximity to similar neigh-
borhoods. Such clustering is likely in the spatial data
typical of environmental justice studies, and it means that
the error terms in statistical analyses do not satisfy the in-
dependence conditions—and thus significance levels can
be overstated. This is a thorny issue, but a few recent stud-
ies have suggested that though this problem may be im-
portant in theory, its impacts on significance levels,
particularly for race, are relatively slight (Pastor et al.
2004, 2005a).
18. Studies have linked air pollution exposures to preterm
birth, low birth weight, and birth defects (Bobak 2000,
Ritz et al. 2002, Ritz et al. 2000, Ritz and Fei 1999), and
a recent study by Kenneth Chay and Michael Greenstone
(2003) finds that air pollution has a significant impact
on infant mortality. Pastor, Sadd, and Morello-Frosch
(2005b) have suggested that differential levels of haz-
ardous air pollutants may also impact asthma rates and
the academic performance of young schoolchildren.
19. Although the clinical significance of these differences are
not known, these results do have public health signifi-
cance, especially given that these air toxics exposures are
fairly ubiquitous and affect a significantly large number
of people (Morello-Frosch, Pastor, and Sadd 2001).
20. For example, whereas the 2000 census reported that
only 2.9 percent of non-Latino whites in the United
States took public transit to work, the comparable fig-
ures for Latinos and blacks were 8.9 and 12.2 percent re-
spectively. Data here and for the figures for New Orleans
are taken from tables PCT65B and PCT65I of Summary
File 3, U.S. Census, 2000, through runs using American
FactFinder (http://factfinder.census.gov).
21. Amnesty International (2004) reports that in addition to
those who died in the immediate aftermath of the Bhopal
disaster, at least 15,000 more people died subsequently,
and roughly 100,000 people suffer from chronic and de-
bilitating illnesses as a result of the accident.
22. Death compensation from Desai (1997), who also re-
ports that large numbers of false claims were filed; injury
compensation from Amnesty International (2004, 63).
23. Data on the city and metro area percent African American
taken from table P8 of the U.S. Bureau of the Census
Summary File 1, 2000, and includes only non-Hispanic
blacks; the numbers are virtually identical for all black
residents.
24. Platt reports that 40 percent of all payouts from the gov-
ernment’s National Flood Insurance Program have been
for “200,000 structures that have experienced repetitive
losses: two or more claims while insured” (1999, 280).
25. Using a more recent database and slightly different
methods and samples than Melvin Oliver and Thomas
Shapiro (1995), Maury Gittleman and Edward Wolff
(2000) suggest that 50 percent of black wealth and 
30 percent of white wealth is due to one’s primary home.
26. The pattern is not limited by race. In a study of the 1997
Red River Valley Flood in largely white area of North
Dakota, homeless, unemployed, and low-income women
were less able than more affluent women to evacuate to
alternative shelters (Morrow and Enarson 1999).
27. In the Coalinga, California, 1983 earthquake, whites
faced more damage to their workplaces than Latinos be-
cause whites worked downtown and Latinos in agricul-
ture (Bolin and Bolton 1986). Hispanics, however, were
unlikely to have household insurance, and they were
more likely to have moved more frequently after the dis-
aster than whites. After the Northridge earthquake, many
Latinos faced political and cultural marginalization, and
limited housing and employment opportunities, which
impacted their ability to successfully recover in the long
term (Bolin and Stanford 1998).
28. Muñiz also suggests that FEMA should be more forth-
coming in educating immigrants that households may be
eligible for assistance even if some members are undoc-
umented as long as there are eligible family members, in-
cluding U.S. citizen children (2006, 4).
29. See http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/
2005/09/06_ap_katrina/.
30. FEMA’s temporary housing assistance program is de-
signed for those who had stable housing before the dis-
aster, and therefore SRO residents, who do not live
continuously in their rooms, do not qualify.
31. See also the 2005 RAND analysis of racial differences
in the perceptions of postal workers and U.S. Senate
staffers in Washington after they were exposed to a let-
ter contaminated with anthrax in 2001 (Blanchard et al.
2005; see also Hughes 2002).
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32. A precautionary regulatory strategy would also address
the significant problem of “toxic ignorance” that cur-
rently plagues our environmental regulation system.
There are more than 80,000 chemicals currently regis-
tered for commercial use in the United States, and about
3,000 of these are high production volume chemicals.
For more than 80 percent, we lack adequate toxicologi-
cal data needed to assess their potentially adverse human
health effects (Thorton 2000).
33. The EU’s REACH (registration, evaluation, and autho-
rization of chemicals) program would require commer-
cial firms to register chemicals currently produced or
imported in large quantities with a central EU database.
A designated EU agency would be responsible for assess-
ing this information on a case-by-case basis and use of
chemicals that exhibit certain hazardous characteristics
(such as persistent bio-accumulative toxins [PBTs] and
endocrine disrupting chemicals) would be banned unless
specifically authorized by regulatory agencies.
34. For one set of widely endorsed principles for equitable
development in the rebuilding process for the Gulf Coast
drafted by PolicyLink, a national intermediary that works
in low-income and minority communities, see http://
www.policylink.org/EquitableRenewal.html.
35. As the gap between the wealthy and the poor increases
in the United States, there will be more low-income res-
idents in risky housing situations, particularly mobile
homes. This situation could be remedied by enforcing
and subsidizing programs to improve the strength of
mobile homes in high winds, and by requiring mobile
home park owners to provide tornado shelters in areas
where this is an issue.
36. One criticism focused on President Bush’s decision to
place FEMA within the Department of Homeland
Security. It may make sense to separate the agencies, re-
store funding and power back to FEMA, and once again
support the FEMA Mitigation Directorate. This could
be accompanied by an attempt to encourage the disaster
professionals who have left FEMA in the last few years,
partly because of frustrations with the diversion of re-
sources, to return and help the agency become more ef-
fective in carrying out its mission. We would leave such
specifics, however, to the sort of investigation and rec-
ommendation committee we suggest.
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